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THE MANDATORY/ENABLING BALANCE IN
CORPORATE LAW: AN ESSAY ON
THE JUDICIAL ROLE*
John C. Coffee, Jr. * *
INTRODUCTION
A half-filled glass of water can be described as either half full or
half empty. The structure of American corporate law-partly enabling,
partly mandatory in character-can be viewed in much the same way.
Some commentators see American corporate law as primarily com-
posed of mandatory rules that the shareholders themselves cannot
waive or modify.' In their view, this mandatory component compen-
sates both for the absence of true bargaining among the parties and for
the inevitable divergence of interests between the principals (the share-
holders) and their agents (the managers and directors). Conversely,
other commentators, to whom this Article will refer as "contractari-
ans," see corporate law as primarily composed of waivable "default
rules," which the law provides as a model form contract in order to
reduce the transaction costs of contracting. 2 Under this view, the
*Copyright ©John C. Coffee, Jr. 1989.
** Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University. In writing this draft, I
have benefited from discussions with Bernard Black, Jeffrey Gordon, William Klein,
Jonathan Macey, Henry Monaghan, Mark Roe and Robert Thompson. None bears re-
sponsibility for the views expressed herein.
1. The leading spokesman for this position is Professor Victor Brudney. See, e.g.,
Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
Colum. L. Rev. 1403, 1410-11 (1985). Professor Melvin Eisenberg's prior work would
also place him under this general heading. See M. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Cor-
poration: A Legal Analysis 1-6, 316-20 (1976). In his contribution to this Symposium,
Professor Eisenberg acknowledges that some contractual modifications of default rules
are possible, but he considers the core of corporate law, including the law pertaining to
fiduciary duties, to be mandatory. See Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1461, 1462 (1989). Professor Deborah DeMott has also recently taken a
strong mandatory position. See DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 Duke LJ. 879, 915-23 (1988). I will not attempt to divide the rest of
my professorial colleagues into two camps, but, lest I appear to be feigning neutrality, I
would acknowledge that I am closer to the mandatory end of the continuum, although
clearly not as close as those listed above. However, I argue that what is most mandatory
is not a particular rule, but rather the use of courts as an ex post dispute resolution
mechanism to resolve those issues and contingencies that the inevitable incompleteness
of the corporate contract leaves open. The critical issue is what criteria should guide
courts in the exercise of their gap-filling responsibility. In this Article, I argue that
courts should perform their ex post role by seeking to create ex ante incentives for the
disclosure of private information. That is, courts should construe the fiduciary con-
straints of corporate law strictly unless the parties have opted out from them in a fashion
that permits accurate pricing of the departure. This position is, I argue, both different
from and superior to the traditional contractarian and anticontractarian positions.
2. Among lawyers, the leading proponents of the enabling perspective are Judge
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parties are free to "opt out" of these "off-the-rack" rules if they wish to
strike a different bargain that is more individually tailored to their spe-
cific circumstances. 3
Contractarians thus view corporate law as simply a modest exten-
sion of contract law, while their opponents regard the analogy between
contract and corporate law as descriptively inaccurate. Both sides
reach their respective positions because of a shared assumption that
mandatory legal rules are "anticontractarian"; that is, the description of
the corporation as a contract (or as a "nexus of contracts") implies for
both sides that the law should permit shareholders to write or amend
the corporate contract in virtually any way they see fit. Because the
anticontractarians believe that shareholders should not be permitted to
opt out from the mandatory core of corporate law, they tend also to
resist the contract law analogy. As a result, they have tended to over-
look the degree to which modem contract law itself contains important
mandatory elements.
Once the debate between the contractarians and their opponents
has been joined in this fashion, its focus has generally shifted from law
to economics and, more specifically, to the question of whether market
forces provide an adequate substitute for actual bargaining. Although
the issue of how well the market prices corporate governance terms can
certainly be sensibly debated,4 an exclusive focus on economics ignores
an important feature common to all forms of long-term relational con-
tracts: namely, that courts have invariably played an active and indis-
pensable role in monitoring and interpreting such agreements. 5
Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 Yale L.J. 698, 700-03 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in
Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & Econ. 395, 401-03 (1983); Fischel, The Corporate Govern-
ance Movement, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259, 1264 (1982). For an economist's view, see
Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26J.L. & Econ. 1, 3-6 (1983). Professor
Jonathan Macey is usually associated with this camp, since he argues that the corporate
charter could authorize insider trading. See Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The
New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 9, 62-63 (1984).
Of course, no legal writer has suggested that corporation law is exclusively mandatory or
exclusively enabling. The issue is rather whether they see the glass of water as half full
or half empty.
3. As Professor Fischel has phrased it, "corporate statutes provide a set of stan-
dard-form terms, but firms are generally free to alter these terms in their charters or by-
laws." Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and Cor-
porate Law, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1061, 1063 (1984). For the fullest statement of their
views on opting out, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 2,
at 402-04.
4. Indeed, I have explored this question before. See Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out,
the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53
Brooklyn L. Rev. 919, 941-50 (1988).
5. The term "relational contract" was coined by Professor Ian Macneil. See I.
Macneil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations 71
(1980); Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 691, 720 (1974).
Such a contract is used to govern a long-term relationship in which all contingencies and
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Indeed, the feasibility of such contracting probably depends upon the
parties' ability to rely upon the courts to play such a role. In this light,
analogizing the corporation to a long-term contract may suggest not
that the mandatory features of American corporate law are vestigial
remnants of an earlier era that was hostile to private ordering, but
rather that these provisions are analogous to similar legal rules that
restrict opportunism in other areas of complex, long-term contracting.
Put simply, the more closely one looks at long-term contracting, the
more one realizes that judicial involvement is not an aberration but an
integral part of such contracting.
The intent of this Article is not simply to defend the proposition
that some mandatory component to corporate law is thus inevitable,
but also to understand where the line should be drawn between the
mandatory and enabling components. Unfortunately, no contributor
to the Symposium has undertaken a comparative examination of the
mandatory/enabling balance in the corporate law ofjurisdictions other
than the United States, but a fair generalization is that the law of Great
Britain and other Commonwealth countries is far more mandatory in
character than is ours. 6 Does this mean that their law is less efficient (as
proponents of deregulation would seemingly have to predict)? Such a
prediction is oversimple because it misses a key tradeoff: to the extent
that American courts have permitted greater contractual freedom in
corporate law, their relative tolerance has been coupled with greater
judicial activism in reading implied terms into the corporate contract
and in monitoring for opportunism. Thus, the issue of contractual
freedom is inextricably entangled with the issue of institutional compe-
tence. Do we rely on prophylactic rules allowing little or no departure
performance standards cannot be specified in advance. See Goetz & Scott, Principles of
Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (1981). Legal academics writing in this
tradition, which borders closely on the field of transaction-cost economics, see William-
son, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. &
Econ. 233, 238 (1979), have argued that relational contracts are necessarily incomplete
and tend to function as a governance mechanism for future modifications of the parties'
rights and duties. These writers have also assumed that in relational contracts, the par-
ties have substantial freedom to modify any model form contract provided by the state
(i.e., to opt out), although courts will monitor such modifications. See Goetz & Scott,
The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 261, 266-67 (1985) [hereinafter Goetz &
Scott, Limits].
6. For example, fiduciary law in Great Britain has been read to restrict any attempt
by directors of a target company to employ defensive tactics that are common in the
United States. See Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd., [1967] 1 Ch. 254, 268-70 (1963). British
law also closely regulates all mergers and acquisitions, requiring at least the formal
winding up of the company and the appointment of a liquidator. See Companies Act,
§§ 572-605 (1985). For an overview of the laws of Commonwealth countries in this
regard, see DeMott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, in Knights, Raid-
ers, and Targets: The Impact of the Hostile Takeover 398, 408-18 (J. Coffee, L. Low-
enstein & S. Rose-Ackerman eds. 1988).
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from the statutory baseline? Or do we counterbalance contractual free-
dom with ex post judicial review?
A historical perspective frames the issue similarly. Even the most
casual observation reveals that the fiduciary strictures of American cor-
porate law-presumably, corporate law's most mandatory inner core-
have changed dramatically over this century. 7 In truth, corporate law
has been in flux throughout American history, and the fact that the sup-
posedly mandatory core of corporate law has shrunk significantly
presents a problem for those who wish to justify its nonwaivable status.
If it has changed in the past, why should it remain static in the future?
More importantly, attempts to justify its mandatory core on the. ground
that any alternative structure would expose shareholders to uncon-
scionable risks must face the fact that alternative configurations to cor-
porate law exist in other countries and have existed in the United States
over the last century.8
Who then is right-the contractarians or their critics? This Article
answers that both are right and both are wrong, because both have mis-
stated the problem. In this Article's view, contractual innovation can
be reconciled with a stable mandatory core of corporate law if we rec-
ognize that what is most mandatory in corporate law is not the specific
substantive content of any rule, but rather the institution of judicial
oversight. Judicial activism is the necessary complement to contractual
freedom. In short, because such long-term relational contracting is
necessarily incomplete, the court's role becomes that of preventing one
party from exercising powers delegated to it for the mutual benefit of
all shareholders for purely self-interested ends. Indeed, that courts will
at some point intervene is intuitively understood by the bar. In drafting
the corporate contract, lawyers rely less on the model form provided by
the legislature than on their expectation that courts will prevent either
side from taking "opportunistic" advantage of the other.9 That is, the
7. For example, from a starting point that held that interested director transactions
were voidable without regard to their fairness, American corporate law has changed dur-
ing this century so that today the burden of proving unfairness is on the plaintiff (at least
if disinterested director approval is obtained after full disclosure). See Marsh, Are Di-
rectors Trustees?: Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. Law. 35, 36-50
(1966)..
8. On this basis, I would disagree with Eisenberg's contribution to this Symposium,
which seeks to define the minimum elements or rights that rational shareholders would
demand. SeEisenberg, supra note 1, at 1460-66, 1480-81. In my view, there are po-
tentially many different combinations of statutory rights and judicial oversight that could
be equally and adequately protective of shareholders. The mandatory/enabling balance
in various jurisdictions may sensibly differ to the extent that the level ofjudicial activism
also is adjusted to complement these differences.
9. I expect this conclusion about the nature of the judicial role will not come as an
insight to the practicing bar. At the outset of the American Law Institute's Corporate
Governance Project, which has sought to codify in Restatement form the essential rules
of corporate governance, Ray Garrett, a former SEC Chairman and the first Chief Re-
porter for the project, argued that the specific statutory provisions in corporate law
1989] 1621
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parties contract in the shadow of the law, knowing that courts will not
seek simply to enforce the contract as written, but will to some uncer-
tain extent serve as an arbiter to determine how the powers granted to
management by the corporate charter may be exercised under unfore-
seen circumstances.' 0
The immediate relevance of this point about thejudiciary's central
role in relational contracting is that it provides a means by which to
mediate between the contractarians and their opponents. However
skeptical one is of the ability of shareholders to evaluate charter provi-
sions that deviate from traditional fiduciary standards, the often-cited
barriers of high information costs and collective action problems do
not apply with the same force to the court. From its ex post perspec-
tive, a court can more easily determine if opportunistic advantage has
been taken of the minority. Yet, if courts are to play such a mediating
role, the rationale for their power to intervene and reform the corpo-
rate contract becomes especially important.
Several distinct rationales are possible. First, the traditional ra-
tionale argues that all corporate powers are held in trust, and thus the
fiduciary relationship that exists between corporate officials and their
shareholders justifies close judicial scrutiny." Second, one can dis-
pense with the fiduciary rhetoric and adopt an academically popular ap-
proach, known as "hypothetical bargaining," which assumes that, in all
forms of contracting, when a term has been left out of an otherwise
complete agreement, a court should attempt to discover what term ra-
tional parties would have agreed upon had they focused on the mat-
ter.' 2 Under this approach, the parties will be deemed ex post to have
consented ex ante to the term that would have been most rational for
them to specify; in short, rationality implies consent.
mean little. What is important, he said, is the general standard in corporate law by
which all self-interested actions of management can be judicially reviewed. See Garrett,
The Limited Role of Corporation Statutes, in Commentaries on Corporate Structure
and Governance: The ALI-ABA Symposiums 1977-1978, at 95, 101-02 (D. Schwartz
ed. 1979). Garrett recognized that courts are imperfect monitors and that class actions
were often compromised by the self-interest of plaintiff's attorneys, but he believed that
statutory provisions were secondary in importance to the judicial role. In more modern
terms, Garrett can be seen as defending the proposition that the courts' ex post moni-
toring role is a substitute for a fully complete contract which provides for all possible
contingencies.
10. A classic statement of this position was delivered by Adolf Berle in 1931. See
Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1931). hI the open-
ing sentence of that article, Berle argues that "all powers granted to a corporation or to
the management of a corporation, . . . whether derived from statute or charter or both,
are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the share-
holders as their interest appears." Id. at 1049. Of course, this view anticipates that
courts will be the principal enforcement mechanism. It is perhaps the earliest expres-
sion of the view that the corporate charter is a necessarily incomplete contract, which
must be supplemented by judicially administered rules of interpretation.
11. See id.
12. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 79-85 (3d ed. 1986).
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Proponents of hypothetical bargaining assume that rational parties
would agree ex ante on whatever provision maximized value, even if
the resulting gains were to be unequally distributed. Indeed, carried to
its logical extreme, this perspective would justify a term that actually
reduced value for one side if it increased value for the other side by a
more than offsetting amount. Nothing that we know about the real
world suggests that individuals are actually so risk neutral as to behave
in a fashion that is indifferent to the distribution of gains and losses. If
in fact parties do not bargain only to reach the efficient outcome, then
courts would ignore important issues of distributive fairness if they per-
formed their gap-filling role by falsely assuming that the parties desired
only to maximize aggregate wealth. Still, it is not clear that the parties
would bargain so as to split all gains equally.
How then should courts behave when they are asked to fill in an
omission in the corporate contract? This Article's answer is three-fold.
First, the optimal default rule is not the rule that either maximizes
wealth or reflects what rational parties would have intended, but rather
the rule that best compels each party to reveal to the other its intended
use of discretionary powers. The rationale for such a "coercive" de-
fault rule is that it forces those possessing private information to dis-
close it to the market-and hence results in more accurate pricing. In
short, hypothetical bargaining is inferior to actual bargaining, and thus
that default rule is best which creates ex ante incentives to reveal how
one intends to utilize the discretion one is accorded. Second, courts
should behave as they do in other forms of relational contracting by
recognizing that there are mandatory minimum standards of corporate
law, which include a duty of good faith and protections against uncon-
scionable provisions.
Finally, courfs should uphold opt-out provisions that deviate from
traditional fiduciary standards only when they can find that the term has
been accurately priced. Pricing is a critical concept, because it implies
that shareholders have been compensated in the form of a lower cost
for their shares for any managerial (or majority shareholder) power or
right that would not be permitted under traditional fiduciary standards.
Yet, given the informational asymmetries and collective action
problems that are inherent to the corporate context, there is reason to
doubt the market's ability to price accurately the impact of innovative
charter provisions that confer potential power on managers to behave
opportunistically. For these reasons, this Article will submit that accu-
rate pricing requires specificity; that is, the actual operation of the pro-
vision must be relatively clear and specific and not simply confer on
management a right to behave in a way that market forces or moral
standards would usually constrain.
These three approaches-the moral approach of traditional fiduci-
ary law, the wealth maximizing approach of hypothetical bargaining,
and the information-revealing approach of "coercive" default rules-
1989] 1623
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differ significantly in terms of their hostility to contractual innovations
and experimentation. Under the first approach, the justification for ju-
dicial intervention is essentially grounded on moral considerations:
once managers or directors are deemed to be trustees, it follows that
they must subordinate their self-interest to that of their beneficiaries,
the shareholders. This approach then allows courts to articulate
mandatory norms of conduct, which govern most intracorporate rela-
tionships, whether or not the actors themselves have such expectations
or wish them to apply. In contrast, under the second or "hypothetical
bargaining" approach, the justification for intervention becomes not
fairness, but efficiency. Because it would be too costly for the parties to
provide for every remote contingency in their contract, it makes more
sense for them to delegate to a court the task of drafting the appropri-
ate contractual term on an ex post basis when and if the contingency
arises. 13 Proponents of this view expect the court in exercising its gap-
filling responsibility to look not to the common morality, but to how
rational parties would have allocated the risk in order to minimize their
joint costs and realize the greatest aggregate profit. 14
Uniquely, the third approach begins not with the special context of
corporate law, but with contracting generally. Its premise is that rigor-
ous fiduciary duties make excellent default rules. Also, in the absence
of certain judicially administered mandatory terms, such as a duty of
good faith, the costs of contracting would be vastly increased, uncer-
tainty would reign and litigation would become more likely. These
third-party effects justify a certain minimum level of judicial paternal-
ism, but it is founded more on social welfare considerations than on a
particular moral view of what the rights of the parties in a particular
relationship must be. Beyond this mandatory minimum, the parties are
free to contract around those fiduciary norms that require selflessness,
but not around those that seek to prevent fraud and opportunism.
However, such departures from the default rules of fiduciary duty must
be sufficiently specific and bounded to permit the departure to be accu-
rately priced.
This Article argues that both the first and second approaches de-
13. Goetz and Scott give as an example of how this delegation occurs in the familiar
"best efforts" term in contract clauses. By using such a term, the parties empower the
court to determine and enforce standards that they cannot specify in advance. See
Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, supra note 5, at 1114-17. Goetz and
Scott also suggest that the implied fiduciary obligation in other settings should be inter-
preted. similarly. Id. at 1126-30.
14. Easterbrook and Fischel define "[slocially optimal fiduciary rules" as those that
"approximate the bargain that investors and agents would strike if they were able to
dicker at no cost." Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra note
2, at 702. Even assuming that investors would want their agents to pursue the aggregate
wealth maximization of investors, rather than equal treatment, id. at 702-04, I believe
that investors would still want their agents to permit unequal treatment only when and
to the extent that aggregate wealth maximization truly required such unequal treatment.
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scribed above suffer from serious deficiencies. The problem with tradi-
tional fiduciary theory is its hostility to all forms of contractual
innovation. By defining all senior corporate officials as fiduciaries and
then insisting on a fixed normative content for that term, it over-
prescribes. If the purpose of a relational contract is to provide the
framework for some future modification of the contract's terms, a fidu-
ciary theory that insists on exclusivity-that there is, and can be, only
one form of relationship (namely, principal and agent) between share-
holders and managers-seems inconsistent with this purpose. Ulti-
mately, the result is to freeze the corporate form, like a fly in amber, so
that it cannot evolve to meet the external changes currently sweeping
the business world.
In the case of hypothetical bargaining, serious problems exist con-
cerning both its efficiency and its distributive impact. Even its doctrinal
justification for ex post review is shaky in the corporate context, be-
cause in theory the court may reform the contract only when it finds
that there is an omitted term. 15 Yet, because the corporate charter is
the extreme example of a relational contract, it does not attempt to
specify all the parties' expectations. Rather, it seeks only to establish a
governance mechanism-in effect, dealing more with process than sub-
stance. Thus, the corporate contract may appear complete on its face,
without any obvious omissions or gaps for a court to fill.'
6
To date, the debate between the first two approaches has not ad-
vanced very far, because both sides have committed the same mistake
of confusing the descriptive and the prescriptive. The anticontractari-
ans have accurately pointed out that fiduciary law evolved indepen-
dently of the law of contracts and so is not logically governed by
bargaining principles. 17 Yet, even if the contractarians have been too
quick to present their economic model of what corporate law should
become as a positive model of what it has been, the anticontractarians
are not thereby excused from providing a normative rationale for the
mandatory component in corporate law. If the key issue is when and
why contracting out of fiduciary norms should be permitted, then it is
no more ajustification than it was in Holmes' time to state what the rule
15. Although Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the most sensible approach to
defining the scope of fiduciary duties is to ask what the parties would have rationally
bargained for with respect to an unforeseen contingency, the court clearly may not ig-
nore the explicit elements of the parties' bargain. Otherwise, private ordering would be
swallowed by judicial activism. Only when a court can decide that a term is "missing"
from the contract may it supply a term. See Farnsworth, Disputes over Omissions in
Contracts, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 860, 873-76 (1968).
16. Given that fiduciary law supplies the "default rules" for the contracting process,
I believe that it will not be easy for courts in this context to find omissions in the corpo-
rate charter. In short, opting out is different from hypothetical bargaining, because it
presents the court with a term that has been impliedly accepted, unless there is an ex-
press provision negating it. See infra notes 244-254 and accompanying text.
17. See DeMott, supra note 1, at 880-82.
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was during the reign of Henry IV. In short, history does not supply a
normative argument. More importantly, even if it is clear to most that
some mandatory component to corporate law remains necessary, his-
torically based arguments cannot tell us what the content of that com-
ponent should be in an economic environment increasingly dominated
by sophisticated institutional investors.
The basic premise of this Article is that, from a policy perspective,
the permissibility of deviations from the traditional standards of corpo-
rate law should be judged primarily in terms of the competence of
courts or other agencies to monitor these departures and prevent op-
portunism. From this perspective, the traditional objection of the
anticontractarians that shareholders cannot adequately protect them-
selves is not responsive to the contractarian position. Even if well-
known collective action problems and high information costs hobble
shareholder democracy, this objection still ignores the potential role of
courts as a mediating force that can reconcile contractual innovation
with protection from opportunism. Still, before placing such a signifi-
cant bet on judicial competence, one would like some evidence that
courts can halt the erosion of fiduciary duties and have done so in the
past. In this light, this Article is essentially an inquiry into the judicial
capacity to find and hold such an intermediate position.18 In the end, it
finds the evidence mixed, and recommends a more. restrictive standard
than will satisfy hard-core contractarians.
Historically, courts have regularly patrolled the troubled boundary
between the mandatory and enabling components of corporate law
and, over the last century, have repeatedly confronted attempts to
"contract out" of statutory norms. To be sure, corporate law is not
unique in this regard, because courts also have over the same period
been faced with contractual innovations in other areas of the law that
18. Admittedly, even if such an intermediate position is discernible and courts
could enforce it, this resolution will not be satisfactory to many. At its deepest level, the
debate over contracting out involves a philosophical conflict about the ends of private
law. While the contractarians see corporate law as exclusively intended to promote pri-
vate ends, the anticontractarians tend to view the fiduciary component of corporate law
as expressing a public morality, one broadly applicable to a variety of relationships
based on trust and confidence. Thus, the contractarians favor the "hypothetical bar-
gaining" approach because it presents the court in its least intrusive or regulatory guise
as a body that is simply seeking to determine what the parties would have done had they
focused on a problem. Conversely, the anticontractarians are uncomfortable with any
theory that makes fiduciary obligations enforceable only because those subject to them
have implicitly consented; such a premise makes morality rest excessively on the consent
of those regulated. Certainly, it would be a curious view that the validity of the criminal
law rested on the consent of criminals.
While the anticontractarians ultimately resist the corporation-as-contract analogy,
because they fear erosion of the communitarian ethic that they find in fiduciary theory, I
will later suggest that fiduciary morality is in some respects outdated, bounded by its
preindustrial origins, and even hostile to the interests of employees and agents. See
infra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
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were designed to outflank cumbersome or obsolete statutory struc-
tures.19 What is more surprising, however, is that in the now volumi-
nous debate over the legitimacy of "contracting out," no one appears
to have surveyed these earlier instances. If one could assert that courts
have regularly upheld such contractual departures in the past, this data
would at least inform the debate, and possibly force those who believe
contracting out is wholly illegitimate to re-examine their positions.
In fact, the data is not clear-cut, and the number of examples is
limited. The relative infrequency of cases involving a formal effort to
contract out of the mandatory aspects of corporate law is probably at-
tributable to two factors: (1) at least for the last half-century, it has
been easier to avoid the undesired mandatory features of American
corporate law by migration to a more "friendly" jurisdiction of incor-
poration, and (2) many mandatory features of corporate law are simply
too negligible in their impact to justify avoidance measures. Nonethe-
less, a review of those cases dealing with true contractual departures is
instructive, because it shows both that courts have permitted some de-
viations and rejected others and that the trend in judicial decisions has
been toward greater tolerance.
This Article attempts to understand how courts might and should
respond to innovative departures from the traditional norms of corpo-
rate governance. Part I examines judicial responses to prior attempts
to depart from the statutory baseline through charter and bylaw provi-
sions. It will argue that the issues involved in "contracting out" are less
novel than they first appear and that courts have faced similar issues on
a number of occasions over the last century, with very diverse reactions.
Following Part I's historical tour, Part II shifts to a comparative focus
and considers the extent to which analogous mandatory minimum stan-
dards are also embodied in the law of contracts. Although the law of
19. An excellent example of a tolerant judicial response to a contractual innovation
that attempts to avoid a cumbersome and costly formal legal process is the judicial ac-
ceptance of the "Totten Trust" as a substitute for a will and the probate process. A
Totten Trust is a trust created by the deposit of funds (typically in a bank account) by
one person as trustee for another. The trust remains revocable during life, but on the
depositor's death passes to the other party. As a practical matter, people of modest
economic means could use joint bank accounts in this fashion to escape the need for
lawyers, wills or probate. Judicial acceptance of this evasion of the Statute of Wills was
undoubtedly motivated by policy considerations. See In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112,
125-26, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904); Murray v. Brooklyn Say. Bank, 258 A.D. 132, 133-34,
15 N.Y.S.2d 915, 917-18 (1939).
The idea that courts will reinterpret statutory policies in light of new circumstances
and frequently shrink the scope of "obsolete" policies is not a new one and has been
observed in a variety of other contexts. Cf. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the
Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85
Mich. L. Rev. 672, 729 (1987) ("new assumptions of the transitional banking market-
place [have resulted in] the conscious judicial pruning" of obsolete banking regulatory
statutes). Such practices represent not hypothetical bargaining, but interstitial judicial
law making of a familiar kind.
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contracts and the law of fiduciary duties evolved separately, their sepa-
rate origins may only make more important any fundamental conver-
gence between these two bodies of law with respect to mandatory
standards. In particular, Part II will assess the degree of convergence
that has occurred between the duty of good faith in the law of contracts
and the duty of loyalty in fiduciary law.
Part III then attempts to specify the standards courts should use in
determining whether to accept a contractual innovation that departs
from the traditional rules of corporate governance. Finally, Part IV fo-
cuses more generally on the process of statutory interpretation and
asks when, if ever, courts should make new mandatory rules or change
old "default" rules. Here, it is necessary to evaluate the economist's
view that a court construing a contract should apply a "hypothetical
bargaining" approach. The ambiguities in this approach, at least in the
corporate context, are substantial, but Part IV suggests that the great-
est defect of the approach is its unexamined focus on what the parties
"would have wanted," instead of on how to make them bargain for
what they do want. This discussion intersects with an important con-
temporary debate over stare decisis and statutory interpretation be-
tween those who believe courts should read statutes as reflecting
"private deals" among competing interest groups, which compromises
should be respected by courts, and those who believe that statutes
should be read as "public regarding" unless otherwise clearly
demonstrated. 20
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF "OPTING OUT"
The contemporary debate over the validity of corporate charter
provisions that conflict with, or at least depart from, the established
norms of corporate governance is unique only in its self-consciousness.
In fact, this debate has had a number of antecedents over the last cen-
tury, but because these earlier battles were fought over specific, narrow
issues, not the broader, more abstract questions of private ordering
and market failure, their relevance has largely escaped attention.
If one asks at the outset whether courts are capable of invalidating
a charter provision adopted by the shareholders without any proce-
dural irregularity, the answer is clearly yes. Cases easily can be cited in
which unorthodox provisions have been invalidated On grounds that
they conflicted with a statutory policy2' or even a policy founded only
20. For a discussion of the rival approaches ofJudge Easterbrook and Professor
Macey, see infra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
21. For example, in 1940, the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a corporate
charter amendment that authorized the holders of the Glass A stock (which consisted of
only 5,000 shares out of a total of 700,000 otherwise identical outstanding shares) in
effect'to veto, through a 40%o vote, the choice of any director elected by all the share-
holders. Aldridge v. Franco Wyoming Oil Co., 24 Del. Ch. 349, 350, 14 A.2d 380, 381
(1940). The court construed this provision as requiring two elections, one by all the
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on common-law norms.2 2 In many of these cases, the degree of conflict
was at most oblique, and the court's sense of public policy was probably
determinative. 23 On the other hand, at least when special justifications
shareholders and another by the Class A stock to ratify or disapprove the choice of the
majority. Id. at 352, 14 A.2d at 381. The court found the provision to be invalid as
lacking any legislative authority. Id. Of course, it would have been possible to approxi-
mate the same result by giving the Class A stock 20 votes per share, although such a
provision would have amounted to granting voting control to the Class A stock and not
simply a veto power. In principle, it can be argued that the greater should subsume the
lesser, and that a result that can be reached by one route should not be precluded by
another, less drastic, route.
Other decisions that have invalidated special voting arrangements include Smith v.
California Thorn Cordage, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 93, 98-99, 18 P.2d 393, 395 (1933) (in-
validating contract requiring at least three directors to exercise corporate powers); Ab-
ercrombie v. Davies, 35 Del. Ch. 599, 611, 123 A.2d 893, 900 (1956) (invalidating
provision allowing shareholders to usurp role of board in managing close corporation),
modified, 36 Del. Ch. 102, 125 A.2d 588 (1956), rev'd on other grounds, 36 Del. Ch.
371, 130 A.2d 338 (1957); State ex rel. Ross v. Anderson, 31 Ind. App. 34, 45, 67 N.E.
207, 211 (1903) (charter provision may not cancel annual election of directors); Benin-
tendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 117, 60 N.E.2d 829, 830-31 (1945) (invalidat-
ing bylaw requiring unanimous consent of shareholders to elect directors).
22. State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 87, 143 A. 257, 259
(1926) (en banc) (invalidating restriction that effectively denied shareholders' common-
law right to inspect corporation's books and records).
23. Such policy preferences have sometimes wavered unpredictably, however. The
case law on voting trusts in particular shows the degree to which judicial attitudes have
shifted back and forth. Early decisions often invalidated voting trusts as against public
policy on the debatable ground that any "arrangement that permanently separates the
voting power from stock ownership nullifies ... the annual submission of the question of
the management of the company to the stockholders." Warren v. Pim, 66 NJ. Eq. 353,
397, 59 A. 773, 789 (NJ. 1904); see also Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 60 Conn. 553,
579-80, 24 A. 32,41 (1890) (policy that stock ownership must control management and
property of corporation is frustrated if stockholders "surrender all their discretion in the
important matter of voting"). Beginning in the early twentieth century, the majority of
courts upheld voting trusts. See, e.g., Bullivant v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 Mass. 324, 333,
141 N.E. 41, 44 (1923); Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co., 111 Va. 1, 28-30,
68 S.E. 412, 421-22 (1910); see also Massa v. Stone, 346 Mass. 67, 74-75, 190 N.E.2d
217, 222-23 (1963) (describing prior case law).
Still later, the field was preempted by statutes, and courts ruled that voting trusts
derived their validity solely from the statute (in short, a "mandatory" view of corporate
law). See, e.g., Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del. Ch. 33, 45, 191 A. 823,
828 (1937). The issue then became whether an agreement that disclaimed being a vot-
ing trust was one in substance and hence invalid if it had not complied with the statutory
requirements applicable to voting trusts, which included disclosure to the other share-
holders. In one well-known case, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancery
Court and invalidated a shareholders' agreement by which six minority shareholders
pooled their stock in a common escrow to form a 54% block to be voted by
supermajority vote of agents appointed by each of the six shareholders. Abercrombie v.
Davies, 36 Del. Ch. 371, 386, 130 A.2d 338, 347 (1957). Ruling broadly that the agree-
ment "divorced" voting rights from beneficial ownership, id. at 381, 130 A.2d at 344,
the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated the arrangement, notwithstanding its under-
standable purpose of forming a coalition to prevent the largest individual shareholder, a
major oil corporation, from obtaining control, id. at 375, 130 A.2d at 341.
Several years later, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld another arrangement that
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were present, courts have also tolerated extraordinary departures from
the statutory pattern, including wholesale delegations of power to man-
agement that virtually eliminated the role of shareholder voting.24 In
general, courts have been more willing to accept a contractual innova-
tion when they have sensed that the law from which it departed had
become obsolete. Thus, at a time when the common law required a
unanimous shareholder vote before certain corporate actions could be
taken (e.g., a merger or sale of all the firm's assets), several decisions
upheld charter provisions authorizing such transactions on a lesser per-
"divorced" beneficial ownership from voting rights. See Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch.
222, 222 A.2d 800 (1966). To resolve an intercorporate dispute between two families,
the charter had been amended to create a third class of stock, which would elect the
pivotal fifth director on the board. Only one share of this class was issued, and it lacked
dividend and other distributional rights. Id. at 226-27, 222 A.2d at 803. In short, it was
without economic value, but it served as a vehicle by which the corporation's long-time
attorney could be elected to the board to prevent deadlocks. Did this arrangement also
amount to an impermissible divorce of voting rights from beneficial ownership? The
Delaware Supreme Court upheld the arrangement on the highly technical distinction
that the other shareholders had diluted their voting power, but had not divested it, Id.
at 231, 222 A.2d at 806. In all likelihood, the court saw that the prime evil that the
statute intended to prohibit-secret undisclosed voting blocs-was not implicated by
this obviously open and unanimous arrangement.
24. An extreme case is Union Trust Co. v. Carter, 139 F. 717 (W.D. Va. 1905). In
that case, the charter provided that for the first six years of corporate existence the
shareholders would have no voting rights and the directors named in the original arti-
cles of incorporation would continue in office and exercise all powers. On a proposed
sale of the corporation's assets (which normally would have required a shareholder
vote), the court upheld these unusual arrangements in view of both the corporation's
financially distressed condition and the special charter provision. Id. at 730-32. The
court deemed the provision to have been an advance ratification by the shareholders of
any "act of the board of directors not fraudulent in character." Id. at 731. Questionable
as this decision is, it at least seems to recognize a good faith or fraud exception to its
concept of advance ratification by charter provision.
A more recent example of judicial tolerance of contractual departures from the
usual norms of corporate governance in the area of shareholder voting is supplied by
Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977). There, a railroad's
certificate of incorporation, as adopted originally in 1844, provided that each common
shareholder had one vote per share for its first 50 shares, but thereafter only one vote
per 20 shares for all shares over 50. Penn Central, a shareholder that held 28%o of the
railroad's stock but that was limited to 3% of the total voting power, challenged the
validity of this provision, claiming that Delaware General Corporation Law section
151 (a) required that all shares of stock within the same class have uniform voting rights.
Id. at 122. The Chancery Court accepted this argument and invalidated the provision,
but the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, finding that the general provision in section
212(a) permitting charter provisions that departed from the norm authorized even this
unusual departure. Id. at 124, rev'g 364 A.2d 838 (Del. Ch. 1976). Providence & torcester
Co. is then an illustration of a court giving a "thin," rather than a "thick," interpretation
to a statutory policy (here, that of section 151(a)) and therefore upholding an arguably
inconsistent charter provision. Possibly, the court believed that the original parties' in-
tent was to operate the railroad as a leased line serving all the other railroad sharehold-
ers, and not as an independent profit-maximizing enterprise. Cf. cases cited infra notes
209-13 (upholding similar charter provisions).
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centage vote.25 Courts also appear to feel less constrained about up-
holding a provision opting out from a rule founded on the common law
than one departing from a statute, because in the former case the prin-
ciple of legislative supremacy presents less of an obstacle. 2 6
When courts have been confronted with a novel charter provision,
the claim has usually been made that it was authorized by the standard
residual provision in the enabling corporate statute that permits the
charter to contain any provision not contrary to law for the regulation
of the corporation's business.2 7 The reactions of courts to such
residual clauses have differed widely. A 1905 NewJersey case, Audenried
v. East Coast Milling Co.,28 involved the validity of a "housekeeping"
charter provision that permitted the board to act by a unanimous writ-
ten resolution of its directors, instead of at a formal meeting. The NeW
Jersey Vice Chancellor responded to this seemingly mild departure
from the norm as if the shareholders had sought to usurp the legisla-
ture's powers:
If the power to legislate as these incorporators have legis-
lated exists, it must be found in the [residual clause permit-
ting] "any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating
the powers of directors."
Under this clause, it is insisted that the legislature has
granted the right, not only of creating, defining, limiting and
regulating the powers of the corporation, but also the right to
authorize the directors to exercise the powers thus established
according to any method the incorporators may see fit to
adopt, although the power to do this is not granted in express
terms. I do not so interpret these words .... The method of
exercising the power created must conform to settled legal
principles, unless it be otherwise distinctly authorized by the
legislative act. No such express authority is conferred by this
act, and it ought not to be inferred from ambiguous
expressions.
To hold that the legislature of our state, by the adoption
of our General Corporation act, intended to confer upon indi-
viduals an indefinite power of legislation, would require the
25. See, e.g., Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co., 10 Del. Ch. 371, 383, 93 A. 380,
385 (1915); Traer v. Lucas Prospecting Co., 124 Iowa 107, 116-19, 99 N.W. 290,
293-94 (1904). On the other hand, the NewJersey courts refused to uphold action by a
unanimous written consent of the directors (instead of at a board meeting), although
other states had authorized such action by statute. See Audenried v. East Coast Milling
Co., 68 NJ. Eq. 450, 59 A. 577 (Ch. 1904).
26. The Supreme Court has recently indicated that greater deference should be
given to decisions interpreting a statute than to common law precedents in determining
when to overrule a questionable precedent. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109
S. Ct. 2363, 2369 (1989). The principle of legislative supremacy clearly underlies this
differential in treatment.
27. See, e.g. State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 87, 143 A.
257, 259 (1926); Audenried, 68 NJ. Eq. 450, 59 A. 577.
28. 68 NJ. Eq. 450, 59 A. 577.
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adoption of a liberality of construction which the act does not
warrant, and which upon every known principle is contrary to
public policy.29
Audenried shows the ultra-orthodox hostility to innovation, even in in-
nocuous housekeeping rules, of an age skeptical of the corporation. Its
equation of private ordering by shareholders with usurpation of legisla-
tive power seems overstated today, but at the time sounded a theme
that resonated with other courts. Several decades later, in Aldridge v.
Franco Wyoming Oil Co.,30 the Delaware Supreme Court used very similar
language in invalidating an unusual voting provision, which gave one
class a de facto veto power over the election of directors:
The Legislature is the source of power. That branch of
the Government defines the public policy of the State with re-
spect to corporate control. If the extraordinary power con-
ferred on the Class A stock is to be upheld, some provision of
the law must be found which, either by express words or nec-
essary intendment, authorizes the creation of the power. It is
sufficient to say that the right conferred on the special class of
stock, in the guise of a voting right, is not within the intend-
ment of the law as it is now written .... 31
This language comes perilously close to saying that anything not
clearly permitted is forbidden. Yet, as the idea took hold that corporate
law should be primarily enabling in character, judicial attitudes quickly
shifted. A dozen years later, the Delaware Supreme Court announced a
very different and far more permissive standard. In Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp.,32 the court upheld a charter provision that enabled an inter-
ested director to be counted for quorum purposes, and, in so doing,
stated that
the stockholders of a Delaware Corporation may by contract
embody in the charter a provision departing from the rules of
the common law, provided that it does not transgress a statu-
tory enactment or a public policy settled by the common law
or implicit in the General Corporation Law itself.33
In substance, this statement adopts a permissive presumption al-
lowing the parties to depart from the usual default rules, unless they
contravene the "plain meaning" of a statute or the policy implicit in
either a statute or a common-law rule. As a result, the real question
becomes the latitude of discretion courts possess in determining the
29. Id. at 467, 59 A. at 584; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Drake, 35 Kan. 564, 11 P.
445 (1886) (similarly rejecting board resolution procedures not expressly permitted by
statute).
30. 24 Del. Ch. 349, 14 A.2d 380 (1940).
31. Id. at 352, 14 A.2d at 381.
32. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952).
33. Id. at 313-14, 93 A.2d at 118; see also Martin Found., Inc. v. North Am. Rayon
Corp., 31 Del. Ch. 195, 202, 68 A.2d 313, 316 (1949) (corporation's quorum provision
lawful despite departure from common law).
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"policies" underlying these rules. Recent experience shows that the
Delaware courts have been willing to accept truly novel departures
from prior law-such as the "poison pill" or the delegation of the
board's authority to a special litigation, committee 34 -when they have
understood the background context and reasons for the departure.
This Part will survey five such prior episodes: (1) the disputes dur-
ing the first quarter of this century over charter provisions that intro-
duced novel forms of corporate securities; (2) a similar controversy
several decades later over charter provisions that allegedly "sterilized
the board"; (3) the judicial treatment of charter provisions that sought
to nullify the practical effect of cumulative voting statutes; (4) the judi-
cial reaction to exculpatory provisions; and (5) the current controversy
over whether "flip-in" poison pills "discriminate" among shareholders
of the same class.
Before exhuming these long buried disputes, a brief word is in or-
der about the status of American corporate law at the end of the nine-
teenth century. Two mandatory doctrines stood out. First, a central
aim of corporation statutes was creditor protection.35 This was accom-
plished through legal capital rules that regulated the degree to which
shareholder capital could be withdrawn from the corporation. 36 Sec-
ond, American corporate law was highly skeptical of majority rule. It
34. For a discussion of the recent poison pill cases, see infra notes 139-49 and
accompanying text. The other major innovation that the Delaware courts have ac-
cepted-rightly or wrongly-in the last decade is the special litigation committee, a
body of independent directors to which the corporation's authority to seek dismissal of a
derivative action can be delegated. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del.
1981). In contrast, otherjurisdictions have been less ready to defer to this internal tech-
nique for dispute resolution. See Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate Inc., 336
N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983); Alford v. Shaw, 320 N.C. 465, 471, 358 S.E.2d 323, 327
(1987).
35. Corporation statutes.then (and to a lesser extent still today) regulated the char-
acter of the consideration for which stock could be issued and required that the firm
make a representation to its creditors as to its equity capital on its balance sheet. The
elaborate body of law surrounding par value was thus primarily designed to protect
creditors. Most corporation statutes no longer require a corporation to place a par
value on its shares, because at a relatively early point, corporations learned to trivialize
this representation to creditors by using a very low par value. For an overview of this
body of law, which is now largely a vestigial remnant, see B. Manning, A Concise Text-
book on Legal Capital 16-26 (2d ed. 1981).
36. In 1824, Justice Story announced that a corporation's equity constituted a trust
fund for its creditors, and thus could not be withdrawn from the firm. See Wood v.
Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944). This new rule lacked prece-
dent in the prior English case law, but reflected the skepticism then prevalent in the
United States about use of the corporate form. As a result, if dividends were paid out of
funds not covered by the firm's accumulated and undistributed earnings, a trustee could
recover these dividends from the stockholders. This rule was quietly abandoned over
time. One of the first fissures in its foundation came in 1899 when the Supreme Court
held that the dividend could not be reclaimed if the shareholder received it in good faith
and the corporation was solvent at the time it was paid. See McDonald v. Williams, 174
U.S. 397 (1899). This decision was arguably a response to new commercial realities,
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considered some rights to be so fundamental that even a supermajority
of shareholders, or a subsequent statutory change, could not abolish
them.3 7 Such rights were said to be "vested" property rights. Thus, at
common law, "fundamental" amendments of the corporate charter re-
quired unanimous consent,38 a requirement that greatly restricted the
scope of private ordering. Indeed, it seems fair to conclude that the
corporate charter was not truly a relational contract at this stage, be-
cause in most cases, terms of the parties' relationship were not suscep-
tible to modification without unanimous consent. Yet, during the first
half of the twentieth century, courts, and later legislatures, first soft-
ened and then eventually abandoned both these doctrines.39 Although
the "vested rights" doctrine and legal capital rules enforced a truly
mandatory system of corporate law from which shareholders could not
depart, the gradual abandonment of these doctrines cannot be accu-
including the expanded shareholder base of many corporations, which made courts less
eager to enforce aggressively the creditor protection rules of an earlier era.
37. For an overview of the rise and partial fall of the "vested rights" doctrine, see
Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 Geo. LJ. 1593,
1601-27 (1988). For one of the last gasps of this doctrine, see State ex rel. Swanson v.
Perham, 30 Wash. 2d 368, 376, 191 P.2d 689, 694 (1948) (right to vote on a noncumula-
tive basis was a vested right that subsequent cumulative voting statute impermissibly
infringed). The decision has since been judicially overruled. See Seattle Trust & Say.
Bank v. McCarthy, 94 Wash. 2d 605, 610-11, 617 P.2d 1023, 1027 (1980); see also
Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. McGowin, 271 Ala. 414, 426-27, 124 So. 2d 812, 823-24
(1960) (preemptive right held not to be a vested right). As late as 1951, however, a
Pennsylvania court found that a majority of the shareholders of a corporation could not
amend a bylaw restricting share transferability, although legislatively authorized to do
so, because the bylaw had created a vested right that could only be abolished through
unanimous shareholder action. See Bechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208,
213-15, 79 A.2d 661, 663-64 (1951). For an overview of this doctrine's vestigial status,
see Halloran, Equitable Limitations on the Power to Amend Articles of Incorporation, 4
Pac. LJ. 47 (1973).
38. See 12B W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 5776
(rev. perm. ed. 1984). Courts could avoid the impact of this doctrine if they found that
the charter amendment was only "auxiliary" or "incidental." The line between "funda-
mental" and "auxiliary" amendments was uncertain (and probably relatively discretion-
ary with the individual court). Id. During the late nineteenth century, some courts
showed an increased tolerance for charter amendments that expanded the scope of the
corporation's permissible purposes. See, e.g., Durfee v. Old Colony & Fall River R.R.,
87 Mass. (5 Allen) 230 (1862) (upholding charter amendments permitting railroad to
extend its lines and raise new capital therefor, in spite of prior decisions considering
such amendments to be fundamental); Buffalo & N.Y. City R.R. v. Dudley, 14 N.Y. 336,
354-55 (1856).
39. Professor Bratton has recently surveyed the judicial abandonment of the legal
capital rules and concluded that it came at least partially in response to ajudicial recog-
nition that the law was obsolete, because creditors were no longer exposed to loss from
opportunistic behavior by shareholders. As he sees it, courts realized that the new man-
agerially dominated corporations of the late nineteenth century would not be dissolved,
but would be run by professional managers with a view to stability and long-run gain.
See Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationship: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring,
1989 Duke LJ. 92, 106-07.
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rately portrayed as simply a transition from a mandatory to an enabling
rationale for corporate law. Rather, as the vested rights doctrine died,
it was replaced by the idea that those controlling the corporation owed
a duty of fairness to the minority.40 In effect, the trade-off was that the
majority obtained the right to amend the corporate charter (and
thereby to obtain needed flexibility), but the majority's power to exer-
cise control was subjected to a fiduciary constraint that they exercise
their new power only for ends reasonably related to shareholder wealth
maximization. By the 1920s, one can find the Delaware Supreme Court
comfortably explaining that the power to include special provisions in
the certificate of incorporation did not embrace the power to cancel the
shareholders' common-law rights. 41 Such rights could be reasonably
regulated by certificate provisions, but they could be abolished only by
statute. By the 1940s, the doctrine of vested rights was finally laid to
rest in the major commercial jurisdictions. 42 The next several case
studies are snapshots of this transition as it progressed.
A. Vested Rights and Charter Provisions Relating to Corporate Securities
Several distinct issues relating to corporate securities were vigor-
ously disputed during the first decades of this century: whether corpo-
rations could issue a stock without or below par value; whether a
charter amendment could create a new senior security having preferen-
tial rights to the existing shareholders; and whether outstanding stock
could be altered by a charter amendment in a manner that adversely
affected its holders. Over a half century, the prevailing answer to all
these questions shifted from no to yes.
1. Par Value and the Consideration for Shares. - One recent commen-
tator has found that the "par/no par" issue was the most frequently
40. Professor Branson has accurately observed that the transition involved a substi-
tution, rather than simply an elimination of the mandatory element in corporate law.
See Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of
Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 375, 392-93 (1988). A
seminal article discussing this shift in judicial emphasis is Latty, Fairness-The Focal
Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1942). For a case
illustrating the transition, see Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 105 R.I. 36, 44-45, 249
A.2d 89, 94 (1969) (upholding dividend arrearage elimination).
41. See State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 87, 143 A. 257,
259 (1926). In Cochran, the certificate provided that the shareholders' ability to inspect
corporate records was at all times subject to the board of directors' permission, which
had been withheld. The court found that the board could reasonably regulate access,
but not withhold it, even if a majority of the shareholders had so provided.
42. See, e.g., Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc., 285 N.Y. 500, 509, 35
N.E.2d 618, 622 (1941) (upholding amendment of articles of incorporation to eliminate
cumulative preferred share dividend arearages); McNulty v. W. &J. Sloane, 184 Misc.
835, 840-42, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253, 259-60 (Sup. Ct. 1945) see also Federal United Corp. v.
Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 332-44, 11 A.2d 331, 338-42 (1940) (merger used to elimi-
nate accrued cumulative preferred dividend arrearages).
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debated corporate-law issue., in" law reviews during the early 1920s. 43
Dead as this issue seems today, no clearer illustration can be given of
the limited efficacy of some mandatory rules. By simply inserting a
nominal par-value, for example, $.01 per share, the original purposes
of the par value requirement could be trivialized, as shares could be
issued at widely divergent prices and equity capital could be effectively
withdrawn from the firm through capital surplus dividends. Because
the original requirement that shares have a par value was indisputably
intended as a mandatory rule, the abandonment of this rule represents
a clear example of a judicial decision that a policy had become obso-
lete.4 4 Historically, as courts came to realize that the rationale underly-
ing par value was illusory, they gradually became more tolerant about
permitting deviations from its strict requirements.
As early as 1891, in Handley v. Stutz, 45 the Supreme Court upheld
the issuance of stock at below par value where the market value of an
insolvent company's stock had sunk below its par value. In Stutz, inves-
tors had purchased $45,000 in par value of the common stock of an
insolvent coal company along with $45,000 in face amount of its bonds
for a total cash payment of $45,000.46 Obviously, the stock was issued
at below its par value, probably as an equity "kicker" or throw-in to
make the purchase of the bonds more attractive. The Supreme Court
easily could have required strict adherence to the traditional rule invali-
dating watered stock, particularly given the general distaste that courts
have shown for bonus shares. Yet it did not. Instead, it focused on the
economics of the transaction and essentially recognized that if a stock's
market value fell below its par value, the corporation would be pre-
cluded from issuing shares.47 Thus, a rule designed to protect credi-
tors and shareholders could potentially become a legal trap for the
unwary that could have counterproductive results.48
One year after Stutz, a proposal was made in the New York Legisla-
ture to permit the issuance of stock without par value, which proposal
eventually resulted in the enactment in 1912 of the first legislation au-
43. McChesney, Intellectual Attitudes and Regulatory Change: An Empirical In-
vestigation of Legal Scholarship in the Depression, 38 J. Legal Educ. 211, 233-34
(1988).
44. According to some commentators, courts recognized that the potential for op-
portunism had diminished by the late 1890s, because the large railroad and steel corpo-
rations of that era could not be fraudulently liquidated overnight and their assets passed
out to shareholders as dividends so as to defraud creditors. See Bratton, supra note 39,
at 106-07. I suspect this thesis overstates, but the fear of shareholder opportunism may
have been less rampant than it was at earlier moments in American history.
45. 139 U.S. 417 (1891).
46. Id. 'at 420-21.
47. See id. at 430.
48. Of course, the problem could have been as easily solved by lowering the par
value of the shares, but the validity of such an amendment was probably also unclear in
1891.
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thorizing stock without par value.49 During 'the next decade, several
other states, including Delaware, followed New York's lead either
through similar legislation or court action.50 Although no case has
been found in which the parties sought to opt out and provide for stock
without par value in the absence of statutory authorization, a related
question of the public policy limits on charter provisions arose when
corporations chartered in "no par" jurisdictions applied for licenses to
do business in states requiring par value. At the time, a foreign corpo-
ration's right to do business in another jurisdiction was not clearly es-
tablished, and admission was seen mainly as a matter of administrative
grace. Because the original purpose of par-value stock was to protect
creditors, it would have been understandable for a host jurisdiction to
have considered its own public policies implicated by the admission of
such a foreign corporation. Nonetheless, in State ex rel. Standard Tank
Car Co. v. Sullivan,51 when a Delaware corporation having stock without
par value applied to do business in Missouri, the Missouri court found
that, although its own laws did not permit "no par" stock, par value "is
not an essential feature of a business corporation." 52 The court added
that it saw "nothing inherently fraudulent or contra bonos mores in that
species of stock or in corporations organized with it."5 3 In this light,
the fact that the issue of opting out did not explicitly arise more often in
the past may be primarily attributable to our federal system of fifty-odd
jurisdictions. Those that wished to use the novel provision could sim-
ply incorporate in a state that permitted it.
A second original purpose of the par-value requirement was to en-
sure that each shareholder paid the same amount for his shares. In
1882, Victor Morawetz stated this rule in his famous treatise on corpo-
rations: "[E]very stockholder must contribute a proportionate part of
the capital of the company."' 54 Courts quietly abandoned this rule dur-
ing the early twentieth century, and today there is no dispute that
shares can be simultaneously offered (at least when accompanied by full
disclosure) to different shareholders at different prices. 55 The pattern
49. See Current Legislation-Shares Without Par Value, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 278,
279 (1921).
50. Wickersham, The Progress of the Law on No Par Value Stock, 37 Harv. L. Rev.
464, 464-65 (1924); Current Legislation, supra note 49, at 279 & n. 11.
51. 282 Mo. 261, 280, 221 S.W. 728, 734 (1920).
52. Id. at 280, 221 S.W. at 734; see also North Am. Petroleum Co. v. Hopkins, 105
Kan. 161, 165, 181 P. 625, 627 (1919) (permitting foreign corporation with no par stock
to do business in the state).
53. Sullivan, 282 Mo. at 286-87, 221 S.W. at 737.
54. V. Morawetz, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Other Than Chari-
table § 374, at 377 (1882).
55. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Hodgman, 13 F.2d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 1926); Bodell
v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 128-29, 132 A. 442, 446 (1926), aff'd, 15
Del. 420, 430, 140 A. 264, 268 (1927); Milberg v. Baum, 25 N.Y.S.2d 451 (App. Term
1941) (per curiam). However, courts will review the circumstances of contemporaneous
issuances at different prices for indications of unfairness. See H..Henn & J. Alexander,
1989] 1637
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
here is similar to that observed with respect to charter amendments: a
prophylactic rule yielded over time to a standard of judicial review for
unfairness.
Much the same pattern characterized the gradual judicial abandon-
ment of "trust fund" theory and also the doctrine of preemptive rights.
Dating from the decision of Justice Story in Wood v. Dummer,56 in 1824,
the trust fund theory essentially held that the capital contributed by
shareholders to a corporation in return for their shares constituted a
trust fund for the benefit of creditors. The entire concept of par value
was simply a means of implementing this theory through a mechanical
rule for measuring the size of the trust fund. By the late nineteenth
century, some decisions had begun to substitute a narrower fraud the-
ory for the trust fund in order to limit liability to those instances in
which a creditor could have relied upon a misrepresentation about the
corporation's capital. 57 However, the general skepticism toward pro-
moters underlying the "trust fund" theory survived in a more limited
rule that shares could not be issued for certain kinds of potentially
overvalued consideration. 58 In many jurisdictions a statutory rule sur-
vives today that shares cannot be issued for either notes or future ser-
vices, on the theory that the value of such consideration is often
illusory.5 9 Yet, this rule caused practical problems and often proved to
Laws of Corporations § 168 (3d ed. 1983); Note, Judicial Control Over the Fairness of
the Issue Price of New Stock, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1135-37 (1958).
56. 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944). Essentially, Woody. Dummer was
a judicially created invention to prevent shareholders from removing their capital from
the corporation so as to render it insolvent and defraud creditors. See B. Manning,
supra note 35, at 46; L. Friedman, A History of American Law 199 (2d ed. 1985).
57. See, e.g., Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 198-99, 50
N.W. 1117, 1121 (Minn. 1892) (holders of bonus stock only liable to creditors who be-
lieved that the stock represented actual capital). Conceptually, there were a number of
problems with considering the corporation's assets a trust fund. In particular, it was
difficult to see how creditors who advanced their funds to the corporation before the
issuance of "watered" stock were in any way injured by the later issuance, since they had
not relied on the additional capital so contributed. Thus, in Hospes, the Minnesota
Supreme Court rejected the "trust fund" concept and replaced it with a misrepresenta-
tion or fraud theory, which applied only to subsequent creditors who might have so
relied. 48 Minn. at 194-96, 50 N.W. at 1119-20; Easton Nat'l Bank v. American Brick &
Tile Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 732, 739, 64 A. 917, 919-20 (N.J. 1906).
58. Where the "property" received for shares was valued in terms of its future
earnings potential, rather than its current "actual cash value," a famous NewJersey deci-
sion found the shareholders liable for receipt of watered stock. See v. Heppenheimer,
69 N.J. Eq. 36, 53, 61 A. 843, 850 (Ch. 1905). According to the court, the term "prop-
erty" was limited to "something visible and tangible." Id. at 43, 61 A. at 846. This
hostility to intangible forms of property eased as the twentieth century witnessed the
growth of new industries based on such property. See Pipelife Corp. v. Bedford, 37 Del.
Ch. 467, 145 A.2d 206 (1958) (recognizing value of nonexclusive license as basis for
issuance of shares, but still finding some overvaluation and hence partial liability).
59. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 504(b) (McKinney 1986). For a survey of stat-
utes and cases on the issuance of shares for promissory notes, see 11 W. Fletcher, supra
note 38, §§ 5194-5196 (rev. perm. ed. 1986).
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be a "trap for the unwary."' 60 Courts appear to have sensed this point,
because recurrently over the last thirty years they have grafted excep-
tions onto the seemingly rigid and unqualified statutory rule.6 1 In one
of the first of these modem cases, Petrishen v. Westmoreland Finance
Corp. ,62 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a shareholder-
consent rule: shares could be issued for future services when all share-
holders consented.63 At first glance, this result comes very close to
treating the statutory norm as only a default rule, but, in reality, this
decision and the other judicial exceptions are probably better read as a
judicial response to statutory obsolescence. Today, the original pro-
phylactic rule has shrunk through judicial reconstruction into a consid-
erably thinner rule that looks to the likelihood of actual abuse.64
Preemptive rights provide an excellent illustration of a rule that
was once mandatory, but evolved into a default rule.65 Although recent
60. As Professor Herwitz has pointed out, the restriction on the issuance of shares
for future services complicates the problem faced by some companies in laterally hiring
senior executives who want an immediate equity position. However, since the problem
can be avoided through such standard evasions as the use of no par stock, stock options
and loans to finance executive stock purchases, the restrictions have become merely a
trap for the unwary. See Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in
the Organization of a Close Corporation, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1098, 1111 (1962).
61. See, e.g., Burch v. Exploration Data Consultants, Inc., 33 Colo. App. 155, 159,
518 P.2d 288, 290 (1973) (shares may be issued for promissory note of shareholder if
share certificate is pledged as security for loan); Highlights for Children, Inc. v. Crown,
43 Del. Ch. 323, 328, 227 A.2d 118, 121 (1966) (treasury shares may be issued for con-
sideration that would not support original issuance); Doyle v. Chladek, 240 Ore. 598,
609-11, 401 P.2d 18, 24 (note upheld as consideration, provided shareholder remained
liable for "water" in stock), modified and reh'g denied, 240 Ore. 613, 403 P.2d 381
(1964). Some decisions, however, continue to apply the old prohibition rigorously. See
United Steel Indus., Inc. v. Manhart, 405 S.W.2d 231, 232-33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
(stock issued for future services cancelled).
62. 394 Pa. 552, 147 A.2d 392 (1959).
63. Id. at 557-58, 147 A.2d at 395. The logic of this position seems curious: why
should a rule intended to protect creditors, not shareholders, be subject to waiver by
shareholders, whose only mutual aim may be to overreach their creditors? The statute
in Petrishen seemed unambiguous and prohibited the issuance of shares "except for
money, labor done or money or property actually received." Id. at 557, 147 A.2d at 395.
Thus, Petrishen is probably founded on ajudicial recognition that the statutory policy was
obsolete.
64. Many courts no doubt still will invalidate stock issued for notes, but none are
likely to pierce through form to substance if the corporation lends the funds to the pro-
spective shareholder and receives a note in return for this indebtedness. Hence, to this
degree at least, the downsizing of the old rule supplies a paradigm of the judicial thin-
ning process.
65. For an overview of the statutory law on preemptive rights, see H. Henn & J.
Alexander, supra note 55, § 175. No state today appears to preclude the use of a charter
provision to cancel preemptive rights, and in many states preemptive rights arise only if
they are expressly provided for in the corporate charter. Originally, preemptive rights
were considered a mandatory doctrine, which could not be modified by contract. See
Eidman v. Bowman, 58 Ill. 444 (1871); Gray v. President, Directors and Co. of the Port-
land Bank, 3 Mass. 363 (1807). Exceptions to this rule began to develop in the last half
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changes have been statutory, courts began in the nineteenth century to
relax the doctrine by recognizing a number of exceptions to the rule.66
Again, the pattern is one of a policy-motivated judicial shrinkage of a
rule, not deferral to shareholder choice-at least until the legislature
made the rule a default one.
2. The Issuance of Senior Securities. - In 1879, the New York Court of
Appeals, in Kent v. Quicksilver Mining,67 considered whether an existing
corporation had the authority to amend its certificate of incorporation
to authorize a senior class of preferred stock. The Quicksilver Mining
Company's certificate of incorporation granted it only a vague general
authority "to make such bylaws as it may deem proper to enable it to
carry out the objects of the corporation, and the same to alter, amend,
add to or repeal at their pleasure, provided such bylaws are not con-
trary to the statute or the charter."68 Relying on this authority, Quick-
silver had amended its bylaws to allow the conversion of its common
stock, upon the payment of five dollars per share; into a new class of
preferred stock carrying a seven percent dividend. 69 This simple fact
pattern presents a paradigmatic issue: does the general authority to
amend the corporate contract authorize the taking of an action that ad-
versely affects some existing shareholders? Specifically, can the legal
relationship among shareholders be significantly revised without their
unanimous consent? Although in 1879 the court did not see the issue
in these general terms, it did recognize that those shareholders unable
or unwilling to pay the conversion fee would be effectively prejudiced
by being subordinated to those that paid.70 Thus, it enjoined the
amendment, holding that the power to amend the bylaws did not imply
a power to impair the "vested rights" of the common stock. 71
Although vested rights theory substantially predated the decision
in Kent,72 the decision-was to haunt the subject of charter amendments
for decades. Until well after the turn of the century, courts repeatedly
rejected attempts to alter a security's terms as an impairment of vested
of the nineteenth century. See Ohio Ins. Co. v. Nunnemacher, 15 Ind. 294 (1860).
Nunnemacher appears to treat preemptive rights as a default rule. It held that an ambigu-
ous provision empowering directors to make bylaws "for the management and disposi-
tion of the stock of the company" and to increase capital stock "in such manner as to
them shall seem best" up to $200,000 cancelled any right shareholders had to preemp-
tive rights. Id. at 296.
66. In his classic nineteenth century hornbook on corporate law, Morawetz viewed
preemptive rights as mandatory, but then listed occasions when they did not arise under
then existing case law. Most notably, he recognized that treasury shares were exempt,
citing cases showing that courts had already relaxed the rule to some degree. See V.
Morawetz, supra note 54, § 350, at 354 (citing Page v. Smith, 48 Vt. 265 (1876)).
67. 78 N.Y. 159 (1879).
68. Id. at 162.
69. Id. at 164-65.
70. Id. at 190.
71. Id. at 181.
72. See Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 1601-27.
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rights, usually without examining the fairness of the transaction. 73 ,
Similarly, decisions in this era restricted charter amendments that ex-
panded the corporate objects expressed in the articles of incorpora-
tion.74 This concept of vested rights thus essentially froze the
corporation's capital structure and denied the corporation the flexibil-
ity to pursue new objectives or to issue new classes of securities not
authorized at the moment of corporate formation. Beginning in the
decade between 1910 and 1920, however, courts began to free corpo-
rate law from the straitjacket of vested rights theory. Decisions gradu-
ally permitted the authorization and issuance of new classes of
securities not in the original certificate of incorporation. 75 Other deci-
sions permitted the corporation to expand its purposes and objectives
without a unanimous vote.7 6 Later, the Delaware courts would trivial-
ize the vested rights doctrine by inventing the doctrine that changes
which would have been impermissible if accomplished by a charter
amendment were valid if effected by merger.77 This doctrine of "in-
dependent legal significance" proved the coup de grace to vested rights
theory.
3. Redeemable Stock. - Redeemable preferred stock became com-
mon sometime after 1910.78 Its appearance caused a variety of
problems for courts. A few decisions invalidated the corporation's re-
purchase as a disguised dividend, which was illegal because it failed to
comply with the state law limiting dividends. 79
Redeemable stock also raised a unique problem: could manage-
ment expel dissident shareholders by redeeming their securities pursu-
ant to a broad charter provision? Some cases have upheld this result,
but the Delaware courts have generally resisted it. For example, in Petty
v. Penntech Papers Inc.,80 a charter provision provided that the corpora-
tion could "at any time or from time to time redeem the whole or any
part of the Series A Preferred."81 Broad as this provision was, the
Delaware Chancery Court found that it was limited by Delaware's
73. For a relatively late use of the doctrine to bar the alteration of a redemption
price, see Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.2d 533, 543-44 (D.R.I. 1929).
74. See Atlanta Steel Co. v. Mynahan, 138 Ga. 668, 668, 75 S.E. 980, 980-81
(1912); Colgate v. United States Leather Co., 75 NJ. Eq. 229, 239, 72 A. 126, 130 (N.J.
1950).
75. See In re Sharood Shoe Corp., 192 F. 945, 948 (D. Minn. 1912); Salt Lake City
Auto. Co. v. Keitb-O'Brien Co., 45 Utah 218, 223-26, 143 P. 1015, 1017-18 (1914).
76. Williston v. Michigan S. & N. Ind. R.R. Co., 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 400, 401-02
(1866); Durfee v. Old Colony & Fall River R.R. Co., 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 230, 248 (1862);
Buffalo & N.Y.C. R.R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N.Y. 336, 354-55 (1856).
77. See Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. 318, 333-35, 11 A.2d 331,
338-39 (1940); see also Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 136 F.2d 944, 953 (3d Cir.
1943) (applying Delaware law).
78. Jones, Redeemable Corporate Securities, 5 S. Cal. L. Rev. 83, 83 (1931).
79. See, e.g., Duddy-Robinson Co. v. Taylor, 137 Wash. 304, 242 P. 21 (1926).
80. 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975).
81. Id. at 142.
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mandatory rules of fiduciary duties under which management was de-
nied the right to use corporate funds to entrench itself in office. 82
Thus, Petty supplies a paradigm of the modem alternative to vested
rights theory: namely, the recognition of an implied contractual term.
In economic parlance, the case reveals an unconscious judicial method-
ology paralleling hypothetical bargaining. By reading a fiduciary re-
straint into the contract to limit the opportunistic use of an open-ended
term, the Delaware Chancery Court in effect concluded that sharehold-
ers would have done this had they focused on the question. Doctrinally,
the essence of this approach involves the distinction between the valid-
ity of a power and the propriety of its use in a given case. Since at least
the 1920s, Delaware courts have consistently held that a lawfully dele-
gated power may not be used for an invalid purpose.83 In the close
corporation context at least, New York courts have gone even further,
reading a condition into the contract requiring not only that an "in-
dependent business objective" be shown to justify actions which will
adversely affect minority shareholders, but also that "such objective
could not have been accomplished substantially as effectively by other
means."
84
B. "Sterilization of the Board"
One of the key features that distinguish a corporation from a part-
nership is centralized management; virtually all of a corporation's legal
power is consolidated in its board of directors. These directors in turn
owe a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty to the corporation. Hence,
simply on doctrinal grounds, it is unsurprising that courts have disfa-
vored, and often invalidated, any attempt to bind or predetermine the
discretion of these quasi-public servants through contractual or charter
82. Id. at 143.
83. See State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 86-87, 143 A.
257, 259 (1926) (charter provision subjecting shareholder inspection rights to board's
discretion interpreted to permit only reasonable restrictions); see also Greene v. E.H,
Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 400, 2 A.2d 249, 252 (1938) (provision that non-
employee must surrender share at below market price invalid unless related to success-
ful operation of the business so as to make it "reasonable"). Courts in other
jurisdictions have, however, permitted selective redemptions. See, e.g., Lewis v. H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc., 331 Mass. 670, 675, 121 N.E.2d 850, 853 (1954).
84. Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 492, 335 N.E.2d 334, 338, 373 N.Y.S.2d
122, 127 (1975). Schwartz dealt with an attempt to issue a block of stock so as to upset a
long-standing 50/50 allocation of voting power between two rival factions in a closely
held corporation. Id. at 489-90, 335 N.E.2d at 336, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 125. Although the
procedures followed complied with all statutory requirements, the New York Court of
Appeals invalidated the stock issuance, ruling that "not only must it be shown that [the
issuance] was sought to achieve a bona fide independent business objective, but as well
that such objective could not be accomplished substantially as effectively by other means
...." Id. at 492, 335 N.E.2d at 338, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 127. This severe standard has been
used only with respect to control allocation issues in closely held firms, but it illustrates
how far courts can go in reading implied conditions into the contract.
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arrangements. After all, if fiduciaries have a duty to exercise their best
judgment under the circumstances, it follows logically that this duty
could not be delegated to others. Accordingly, until well after midcen-
tury, voting agreements that sought to bind the voting discretion of
directors were generally deemed to violate public policy and therefore
to be invalid.
The cost of this mandatory rule was often unfair surprise to share-
holders in close corporations, who suddenly found that perfectly un-
derstandable and reasonable contractual arrangements were invalid
because they ran afoul of this prophylactic rule that the board's discre-
tion could not be infringed. When a minority shareholder attempted to
place some limitations on the board's discretion in order to protect it-
self from the tyranny of the majority, courts regularly struck down this
contractual limitation on the ground that it unlawfully interfered with
the "statutory norm" that directors possess unfettered discretion. A
well-known illustration of this principle is the decision in McQuade v.
Stoneham,8 5 which invalidated a shareholders' agreement under which
two shareholders agreed to vote in their capacity as directors to pay a
modest salary to one of them as an officer.86 Today, most students of
corporate law recognize that little erosion of the norms of corporate
governance would have resulted had the agreement been upheld, and
on similar facts other decisions have so concluded.8 7 McQuade thus
presents the hardest case for the anticontractarian to explain why
shareholders should not have been able to contract around an over-
broad statutory norm. Effectively, the case implies that minority share-
holders could not rely upon private contracting to protect their
interests, but instead would be compelled to depend on the mandatory
fiduciary duties to which corporate law subjected directors. In effect,
this is a classic "one horse, one rabbit" trade because shareholders
gave up the certainty of contractual provisions for the uncertain protec-
tion of fiduciary duties. Yet, because the business judgment rule virtu-
ally immunizes most directorial decisions from judicial review, it is
understandable that minority shareholders would prefer the certainty
of a contractual provision.
85. 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
86. Id. at 328, 189 N.E. at 236; see also Smith v. California Thorn Cordage, Inc.,
129 Cal. App. 93, 98-99, 18 P.2d 393, 395 (1933) (invalidating contract to form com-
mittee to control corporate finances as usurpation of directors' powers).
87. For example, according to the Illinois Supreme Court,
Where... no injury to a minority interest appears, no fraud or apparent injury
to the public or creditors is present, and no clearly prohibitory statutory lan-
guage is violated, we can see no valid reason for precluding the parties from
reaching any arrangements concerning the management of the corporation
which are agreeable to all.
Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d. 16, 30, 203 N.E.2d 577, 585 (1964). But see Somers v. AAA
Temporary Servs., 5 Ill. App. 3d 931, 934, 284 N.E.2d 462, 464 (1972) (invalidating
attempt by two sole shareholders to adopt bylaw reducing size of the board).
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Anticontractarians will probably concede today that McQuade was
somewhat overwritten and imposed an undesirable rigidity on business
planning within the close corporation. But they would reply that the
appropriate response was legislative relaxation of the intensity of the
rule. Indeed, many states, including New York, have so responded.
Under section 620 of New York's Business Corporation Law,88 share-
holders of a corporation may adopt a provision in the certificate of in-
corporation that would otherwise be "prohibited by law because it
improperly restricts the board in its management of the business of the
corporation" 89 if: (1) it is unanimously approved by all shareholders of
record; (2) shares are transferred or issued thereafter only to persons
who had knowledge or notice of the provision;90 and (3) the shares are
not thereafter publicly traded on an exchange or an over-the-counter
market.9 ' Seemingly, section 620(b) reflects only a parsimonious ac-
ceptance of private ordering, even in the context of closely held
corporations.
Interestingly, since the adoption of section 620(b) in 1961, consid-
erable litigation has surrounded its interpretation and exclusivity.
Although section 620(b) on its face provides only a limited safe harbor
and thus affirms the prior law of McQuade if agreements are either not
set forth in the certificate or not unanimously adopted, decisions have
read its policy more expansively. Failure to place the agreement in the
certificate has been repeatedly excused.92 Indeed, in Zion v. Kurtz,93 the
New York Court of Appeals, applying Delaware law, upheld an agree-
ment signed by all of-the shareholders of a corporation which provided
that no "business or activities" of the corporation would be conducted
without the consent of a minority stockholder.94 The facts of Zion
presented a difficult pattern in which to uphold the agreement, because
the challenged agreement wholly "sterilized" the board and the provi-
sion had not been inserted in the certificate (as required by both the
New York and Delaware statutes). Nonetheless, impressed by the de-
sirability of encouraging private ordering in the close corporation con-
text, the New York Court of Appeals held that no public policy was
offended by the shareholders' agreement and upheld it,95 suggesting in
dicta that it would reach a similar result under New York law.96
Zion may suggest not only a more liberal attitude toward private
88. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620 (McKinney 1986).
89. Id. § 620(b).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 620(c).
92. See, e.g., Garson v. Garson, 105 A.D.2d 726, 481 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1984); Adler v.
Svingos, 80 A.D.2d 764,436 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Garson v. Rapping, 66
N.Y.2d 928, 489 N.E.2d 765, 498 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1985).
93. 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1980).
94. Id. at 96, 405 N.E.2d at 682, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
95. Id. at 101-03, 405 N.E.2d at 684-86, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 203-04.
96. Id. at 102-03, 405 N.E.2d at 685-86, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
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ordering, but also a willingness to relax the statutory attempt to chan-
nel private ordering through a prescribed format. Prior to Zion, several
New York decisions had invalidated arbitration clauses dealing with
business policy disputes on this same sterilization ground. 97 Although
these cases are now of doubtful validity, Zion was still a 4-3 decision, in
which the dissenters would have struck down the provision (under both
New York and Delaware law) precisely because the agreement did not
comply with the statutory procedures specified by Delaware.98 In the
wake of Zion, the obvious question is how many more procedural short-
comings a court will tolerate in the next case. Suppose only nine out of
ten shareholders of a New York corporation approve a provision, so
that the unanimity provision in section 620(b) is not satisfied, and the
provision is not inserted in the corporate charter. Would a New York
court give effect to this provision, at least if the tenth shareholder was
not unfairly surprised? 99
For immediate purposes, Zion shows a court rethinking old law and
reinterpreting it in the light of a new statutory policy to uphold contrac-
tual arrangements not technically within the protective shelter of the
statute. As such, it is a classic illustration of purposive statutory inter-
pretation that' looks beyond the statute's narrow statement to its
broader policies. At a minimum, it reveals the extent of the discretion
that courts possess even in an area littered with old precedents.
C. Cumulative Voting and Its Evasion
Cumulative voting for the election of directors was first mandated
by the Illinois Constitution of 1870.100 Uniquely, it was an exogenous
reform, one pressed less by any recognizable corporate constituency
than by political reformers. In Illinois, its adoption was instigated by
Joseph Medill, then editor of the Chicago Tribune, who had been much
97. See, e.g., Glekel v. Gluck, 37 A.D.2d 1, 321 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 30 N.Y.2d 93, 281 N.E.2d 171, 330 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1980); cf. Burkin v. Katz, I
N.Y.2d 570, 574, 136 N.E.2d 862, 865, 154 N.Y.S.2d 898, 902 (1956) (removal of direc-
tor nonarbitrable issue); Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297
N.Y. 174, 178-79, 77 N.E.2d 633, 634-35 (1948) (contractual delegation of managerial
power terminable through arbitration invalid because provision completely sterilized
board).
98. 50 N.Y.2d at 108-12,405 N.E.2d at 689-91,428 N.Y.S.2d at 207-10 (Gabrielli,
J., dissenting in part).
99. The answer already may have been given to this question by GAF Corp. v. Wer-
ner, 66 N.Y.2d 97, 485 N.E.2d 977, 495 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1083 (1986). The Werner court found that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(1982), preempted state law and permitted the use of arbitration even in the case of a
publicly held corporation to which section 620(b) is by its terms inapplicable. 66 N.Y.2d
at 105, 485 N.E.2d at 982, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 317. Thus, arbitration today seemingly can
supersede the derivative suit even in the context of the publicly held corporation.
100. Ill. Const. art. XI, § 3 (1870); Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78, 83, 126 N.E.2d
701, 705 (1955) (citing constitutional provision).
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influenced by the views ofJohn Stuart Mill.' 0 1 England, however, has
never adopted the reform, apparently in the belief that it would only
produce unproductive division on the board. 10 2 Although a number of
states followed Illinois in adding such a mandatory provision to their
state constitutions, the recent trend has been for states to repeal this
provision and make cumulative voting either optional or a default pro-
vision that applies only if a contrary provision is not made.' 03
In theory, cumulative voting assures minority representation and a
window into the corporation. In reality, the influence of minority direc-
tors can be negated in a number of ways, and some well-known stan-
dard strategies for evasion exist. For example, assume a nine-person
board and a corporation with 1,000,000 shares outstanding. Mathe-
matically, it can be shown that on these facts any person or group hold-
ing 100,001 shares can cumulate votes so as to assure election of one
director. But change the board's structure either by reducing it to
three directors or, more likely, by classifying the board into three
classes of three directors, each serving a staggered three-year term so
that only three directors are elected each year, and then 250,001 shares
(or 25%) are necessary to assure the election of a single director. Does
a charter provision adopted to minimize the ability of minority share-
holders to utilize cumulative voting and gain board representation frus-
trate the policy underlying these constitutional provisions? In short, is
such a charter provision against public policy?
To date, courts have split on this question, but the majority have
found such a charter provision acceptable. An illustrative case is
Bohannan v. Corporation Commission.10 4 The Arizona Corporation Com-
mission had refused to accept for filing the articles of incorporation of a
proposed Arizona corporation that had staggered its board in exactly
the fashion described above on the ground that it violated the state
constitutional provision. Petitioners sought mandamus to compel the
filing and, after losing at the trial court level, were successful in the
Arizona Supreme Court. Although the appellate court did not accept
the proposition that cumulative voting could be wholly neutralized by a
charter provision, it was willing to accept some chilling of the right. 10 5
The court drew a distinction between a staggered board with three di-
rectors in each class and a staggered board with only one director in
each'class. The latter provision, it said, would be "illegal and void as
101. See W. Gary & M. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations 260 (5th
ed. 1980).
102. See Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporations, 69
Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1390 (1956).
103. For example, Illinois and Pennsylvania have repealed their constitutional pro-
visions. See H. Henn &J. Alexander, supra note 55, § 189, at 496 n.21. Moreover, the
Model Business Corporation Act no longer mandates cumulative voting but simply
makes it an optional provision. Id. at n.16.
104. 82 Ariz. 299, 313 P.2d 379 (1957).
105. Id. at 304, 313 P.2d at 382.
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coming within the implied prohibition of the constitution."'10 6 The
court then added: "[B]ut merely because it is possible to circumvent
the constitution by one method of staggering directors does not mean
that all schemes or plans to that end are within the implied prohibi-
tion."' 0 7 Plainly, this implies that some evasion or infringement is per-
missible, as long as it is not too much. How much is too much?
Bohannan represents the more common judicial response: namely,, to
find that the policy of cumulative voting was not to assure strict propor-
tional representation, but only some opportunity for minority member-
ship.108 Possibly, the problem for these courts was that there was no
effective way to protect cumulative voting. Even if staggered boards
were precluded, one could still reduce the size of the board by other
means-for example, by a charter amendment,' 0 9 or by removal of the
minority director so elected (if removal without cause were author-
ized). 10 Finally, the desired impact of cumulative voting can be nulli-
fied simply by holding informal meetings at which the real corporate
business is conducted (without the dissident director) and then using
the formal meeting as a purely ceremonial occasion.
In this light, the relatively permissive judicial reaction to these eva-
sive tactics can be interpreted as reflecting a judicial willingness to con-
vert a mandatory rule into an optional default rule because courts
sensed that the underlying policy was either obsolete or unworkable.
At the least, this is an area in which most courts have been content to
ascribe modest and circumscribed policies to legislative enactments and
have not invalidated private arrangements simply because they fell
within the outer penumbra of those policies.
106. Id. at 301, 313 P.2d at 381.
107. Id. at 302, 313 P.2d at 381.
108. For similar holdings, see McDonough v. Copeland Refrigerator Corp., 277 F.
Supp. 6, 8-9 (E.D. Mich. 1967); Stockholders Comm. for Better Management of Erie
Technological Prods., Inc. v. Erie Technological Prods., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 380, $88
(W.D. Pa. 1965); Humphrys v. Winous Co., 165 Ohio St. 45, 59, 133 N.E.2d 780, 789
(1956); Janney'v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282, 288, 128 A.2d 76, 80 (1956).
But see Wolfson v. Avery, 6 111. 2d 78, 93-95. 126 N.E.2d 701, 710-11 (1955) (staggered
board violates Illinois constitutional provision requiring cumulative voting); State ex rel.
Syphers v. McCune, 101 S.E.2d 834, 838-39 (W. Va. 1958)(bylaw providing for stag-
gered election of directors vitiates voting and is invalid). The earliest cases also were
more restrictive of such charter restrictions on cumulative voting. See Wright v. Central
Cal. Colony Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 536, 8 P. 70, 73 (1885).
109. Reduction in board size for this purpose has been upheld. See Bond v. Atlan-
tic Terra Cotta, 137 A.D. 671, 122 N.Y.S. 425 (1910), aff'd mem., 151 A.D. 938, 135
N.Y.S. 1101 (1912), aff'd mem., 210 N.Y. 587, 104 N.E. 1127 (1914).
110. Cases have split on the validity of such a removal. Compare Campbell v.
Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 573, 134 A.2d 852, 858 (1957) (removal valid) with In re
Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc. 761, 762, 116 N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (re-
moval invalid).
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D. The Duty of Loyalty and Exculpatory Provisions
Not surprisingly, exculpatory provisions in the corporate charter
that attempt to curtail the duty of loyalty have received a very skeptical
reception from courts."' Does this imply that fiduciary duties in their
traditional form may not be modified by contract? This seems an over-
statement, because some modifications relaxing the duty of loyalty at
the margin have been accepted by courts. 11 2 In truth, there have been
relatively few decisions dealing with board or shareholder actions that
exculpated a fiduciary, probably because most states have codified the
duty of loyalty in a manner that substantially relaxes the rigor of the
traditional rule." 13
Still, there have been some cases in which courts have insisted on a
fiduciary ethic that disallows even reasonable claims by corporate offi-
cials against their corporations. The most striking example of such ju-
dicial action is New York Dock Co. V. McCollum. 1 4 McCollum found that
the New York Dock Company was not required to indemnify the litiga-
tion expenses of several of its directors who had successfully defended
a derivative action brought against them." 5 Because no bylaw or other
contractual provision required indemnification, these directors were
forced to argue that principles of agency law required that they be re-
imbursed." 6 The court not only rejected the claim that there was a
duty to indemnify, but in an important dictum went on to suggest that,
even if there had been a contract, it would not be obliged to enforce
it." 7 Indemnification, it concluded, should be permitted only if the
court determined it to be fair and equitable under the circumstances., 18
This dictum, which probably overstated the legal restrictions on
the corporate power to indemnify, 1 9 caused the New York Legislature
to react by passing the first indemnification statute two years later in
111. See cases discussed infra notes 114-26 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
113. The first statutory codification of the duty of loyalty was passed by the
California Legislature in 1931. Most such statutes have softened the traditional fiduciary
standard, which required both full disclosure and fairness. See Bulbulia & Pinto, Statu-
tory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary
Standards?, 53 Notre Dame Law. 201, 204-07 (1977).
114. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
115. Id. at 110, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
116. Id. at 109, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 847. Two years after McCollum, a New Jersey court
found a duty to indemnify on similar facts. See Solimine v. Hollander, 129 NJ. Eq. 264,
273, 19 A.2d 344, 348 (1941); see also In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 215, 45
N.W.2d 388, 393 (1950) (recognizing common-law right to indemnification).
117. McCollum, 173 Misc. at 108, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
118. Id. at 109-11, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 847-49.
119. The New York courts later found that there was corporate power to indemnify
successful directors pursuant to a contract. See Bailey v. Bush Terminal Co., 46
N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd mem., 267 A.D. 899, 48 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1944),
aff'd mem., 293 N.Y. 735, 56 N.E.2d 739 (1944).
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1941.120 Because all jurisdictions today have such statutes,1 2 1 the issue
has become academic whether shareholders could relax fiduciary stan-
dards in this area. Still, for present purposes, McCollum's relevance lies
in its certainty that private ordering in this area was impossible absent
judicial oversight and approval. McCollum is arguably a last gasp of the
mandatory view, which continued .to survive in the core area of fiduci-
ary duties even after the demise of the vested. rights doctrine.
Yet, did the common law really say that indemnification must be
subject to judicial approval? In fact, cases well before McCollum had
accepted the principle that shareholders could validly authorize indem-
nification of legal expenses, at least in the case of successful directors
and officers.' 22 While these cases dealt with indemnification of ex-
penses (not actual liabilities) by successful litigants, they show courts
prepared in principle to allow private ordering to proceed to this mod-
est degree.
Indemnification provisions ate but one possible inroad by which
core fiduciary duties of corporate law may be modified. Suppose, in-
stead, that shareholders chose a more direct path than indemnification
and adopted an exculpatory charter provision that immunized their di-
rectors from fiduciary liability. The net effect could be the same as in-
demnification, and greater to the extent the provision protected against
liabilities as well as expenses. Would a court sustain such a provision?
Although a few early English decisions upheld exculpatory provisions
covering negligence liability,123 American courts clearly have been hos-
tile to most attempts to exculpate with respect to the duty of loyalty.
The clearest decision in this regard is Irwin v. West End Development
Co.,124 which refused to give effect to such a provision where the de-
fendant had in effect paid a secret salary to himself.125 "Exculpatory
provisions of corporate articles create no license to steal," thundered
the court.1 26 Still, Irwin was an easy case, to which the law of fraud by
itself would have given the same answer.
A considerably grayer case is Everett v. Phillips.'27 There, a provi-
120. See H. Henn &J. Alexander, supra note 55, § 379, at 613-14 n.ll.
121. Id. § 380, at 1121.
122. See, e.g., Bailey, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 880; see also Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis.
594, 631, 109 N.W. 581, 592 (1906) (upholding indemnification of successful directors,
partly on grounds of shareholder authorization). In Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553,
175 N.E. 222 (1931), the court rejected indemnification because of the absence of share-
holder authorization.
123. See In re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co., [1925] 1 Ch. 407; In re Brazilian Rubber
Plantations & Estates, Ltd., [1911] 1 Ch. 425.
124. 342 F. Supp. 687 (P. Colo.), aff'd in relevant part, 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974).
125. Irwin, 342 F. Supp. at 701; see also Abeles v. Adams Engineering Co., 35 N.J.
411, 173 A.2d 246 (1961) (contract between corporation and director without stock-
holder approval unenforceable unless honest, fair and reasonable).
126. Irwin, 342 F. Supp. at 701.
127. 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942).
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sion very similar to that in Irwin had been inserted in the charter of the
Empire Power Corporation, which seemed to state that no contract or
other transaction would be invalidated on grounds of a conflict of inter-
est.' 28 Empire had invested heavily in the bonds of the Long Island
Lighting Company, in which Empire's directors held substantial per-
sonal equity interests. Claiming that there was no corporate purpose
for this self-dealing investment, a shareholder sued derivatively and ob-
tained a judgment at the trial court level. On appeal, the New York
Court of Appeals reversed this judgment, after finding that provisions
in a corporation's certificate of incorporation or bylaws "may be factors
of great weight."' 29
Why was the charter provision in Everett v. Phillips a factor that mer-
ited "great weight" while a nearly identical provision in West End
Development was invalidated as a "license to steal"? Several answers can
be given to this question. Fraud was lacking in Everett because the
transaction was open and visible, no clear corporate injury had resulted
from the investment and, as the court stressed, the corporation's char-
ter had clearly indicated a purpose to invest in other utility compa-
nies.13 0 The last factor may loom the largest because it suggests that if
such transactions are disclosed in reasonable detail in advance, some
modest contractual modifications of the duty of loyalty may be tolera-
ble. Later, this Article will argue that Everett may be read as a case sup-
porting a "transaction specificity" rule.' 3 ' But, in light of Everett, one
cannot safely predict that all contractual modifications of the duty of
loyalty in a corporate charter will be found invalid.
While the duty of loyalty is at the core of fiduciary duties, the duty
of care seems more marginal. Would a court therefore uphold a char-
ter provision that attempted to modify this duty? Without sustained
attention, the most frequently cited treatise on corporate law confi-
dently opines that a charter provision eliminating due care liability-
but not duty of loyalty liability-would be upheld. 3 2 The issue, how-
ever, seems more complex. Today, the permissibility of exculpatory
charter provisions dealing with liability for negligence has been largely
established by statute. Since 1986, when the Delaware legislature au-
thorized charter provisions that eliminate due care liability,' 3 3 the vast
majority of the states have followed in hot pursuit.'3 4
128. Id. at 237, 43 N.E.2d at 22.
129. Id. at 233, 43 N.E.2d at 20, rev'g 22 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1940).
130. Id. at 237, 43 N.E.2d at 22 (charter provision "has the effect of exonerating
the directors, at least in part, 'from adverse inferences that might otherwise be drawn.'"
(quoting Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 297 Mass. 398, 417, 8 N.E.2d 895, 907
(1937))). In effect, the charter provision seems here to have shifted the burden of proof.
131. For a discussion of the transaction specificity rule, see infra notes 206-18 and
accompanying text.
132. See 3A W. Fletcher, supra note 38, § 1047 (rev. perm. ed. 1986).
133. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (1988).
134. See Hanks, Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liabil-
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For present purposes, however, the more interesting question in-
volves the status of a charter amendment that reduces or eliminates due
care liability in the absence of a statutory provision authorizing the
amendment. Earlier this year, the American Law Institute (ALI)
adopted a Restatement-like provision in its Corporate Governance Pro-
ject that authorizes charter amendments that cap an officer's or direc-
tor's liability for duty of care violations at a level that could be as low as
such person's annual compensation from the corporation.l3 5 However,
the ALI rejected proposals that would authorize complete exculpation
by charter amendment. Under the ALI formulation, not only must a
minimum liability remain, but the charter provision must not apply to
liabilities arising out of recklessness, sustained inattention, illegality or
duty of loyalty violations. The doctrinal basis for this compromise was
borrowed largely from section 222 of the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts,' 3 6 which permits a trustee to relieve himself by contract of lia-
bility for negligence, but not for breaches that were in bad faith, inten-
tional or recklessly indifferent to the interest of the beneficiary.' 3 7 A
fortiori, if a trustee can so exculpate himself, why should not a director,
whom the law calls at most a quasi-trustee, also be able to do so?138
Clearly, the ALI's position does not regard the duty of care as sim-
ply a default rule (because some liability is always retained), but it does
permit shareholders to cut back the duty of care to a point where as a
practical matter it is largely coextensive with the duty of good faith.
Implicitly, then, this position supports the proposition that there are
universal mandatory minimum standards to all forms of contracting at
least as much as it does the idea of a presumptive power to opt out.
While no court has yet tested the ALI's position, the nation's preemi-
ity Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. Law. 1207, 1243 (1988) ("Since 1985, more
than four-fifths of the states have enacted some form of legislation to protect directors
from money damages.").
135. See ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommenda-
tions § 7.17 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1989). The author serves as a Reporter to this project
and was the principal draftsman of section 7.17. Section 7.17 was preceded by several
earlier versions that also authorized charter provisions restricting liability. See, e.g., id.
§ 7.16(h)(3) (Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985).
136. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 222(2) (1959).
137. Id.
138. Critics of this position might respond that face-to-face bargaining is possible
with the trustee, but that problems of collective action hobble the shareholders in public
corporations who may not so negotiate. See DeMott, supra note 1, at 922-23. This
overlooks those cases in'which exculpatory provisions have been adopted in trust instru-
ments governing profit-sharing plans, business trusts, condominiums and other entities
having numerous participants who could not bargain on such a basis. See, e.g.,
Morrissey v. Segal, 526 F.2d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 1975); Morrissey v. Curran, 351 F. Supp.
775, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 483 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1128 (1974); Collins v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 217 Ga. 41, 49-50, 120 S.E.2d 764,
769-70 (1961); Kelley v. Astor Investors, Inc., 123 Il1. App. 3d 593, 598-99, 462 N.E.2d
996, 1000 (1984), aff'd, 106 Ill. 2d 505, 478 N.E.2d 1346 (1985).
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nent law reform body has accepted in principle the idea that some con-
tractual modifications of traditional fiduciary duties are possible.
E. The Poison Pill
The recent judicial experience with poison pills strikingly illus-
trates the contemporary significance of the debate over contractual in-
novations that depart from traditional norms of corporate law. Courts
have split over whether the "flip-in" poison pill violates a common stat-
utory provision that all shares of the same class or series be treated
identically.' 3 9 For example, section 501(c) of the New York Business
Corporation Law provides that, subject to limited exceptions in the
charter, "each share shall be equal to every other share of the same
class."' 140 Because the "flip-in" pill enables all shares of the same class
except those held by the bidder to purchase shares at a large discount
on the occurrence of certain defined conditions, the pill arguably "dis-
criminates" unlawfully against the shares held by the bidder, who alone
cannot buy at a discount. Recently, in Bank of New York v. Irving
Bank, 141 New York joined several other states in invalidating a "flip-in"
pill on precisely this ground. 142 Conversely, the Delaware Supreme
Court and some other courts have reached the opposite result under
similar statutory provisions.143 The latter courts have found that the
"flip-in" pill is not discriminatory in the sense intended by the statute
because the disparity caused by the pill is between shareholders, rather
than between shares. 144 Thus, for example, the provision has no fur-
ther effect once the shares held by the bidder are sold to a third party.
At bottom, the key conflict between the New York and Delaware
decisions boils down to their different approaches in interpreting a
common statutory provision. The New York decision in Irving Bank es-
sentially relied on a "plain meaning" rule approach. Giving section
501(c) a literalistic interpretation and finding that the pill did in fact
result in unequal treatment, the court enjoined the pill. 145 No consid-
139. For decisions finding the "flip-in" pill to be impermissibly "discriminatory"
on this basis, see Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1234
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 825 F.2d 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 511 (1987);
Asarco, Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 477 (D.N.J. 1985). But cf. Harvard Indus. v.
Tyson [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,064, at 95,294 (E.D.
Mich. Nov. 25, 1986) (rejecting notion that poison pill discriminates among shares in
same class).
140. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 501(c) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988). For a New
York precedent insisting on strict equality among shares of the same class, see Fe Bland
v. Two Trees Mgmt. Co., 66 N.Y.2d 556, 489 N.E.2d 223, 498 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1985).
141. 142 Misc. 2d 145, 536 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
142. Id. at 148, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
143. Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1346 (Del. 1985); Harvard Indus.,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,294.
144. See, e.g., Harvard Indus., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 95,294.
145. Irving, 142 Misc. 2d at 150, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
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eration was given to whether the disparity in treatment could ever be
reasonably related to a legislative purpose underlying the statute. In
contrast, the Delaware approach in Moran v. Household Internationalt46
was more policy sensitive. Asking whether the pill benefits sharehold-
ers, the Delaware Supreme Court appears to have answered: it all de-
pends. 147 Thus, the Delaware courts have framed a more subtle
standard that looks both to the circumstances at the time of the pill's
adoption and those surrounding its later use to determine if the board's
action was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."1 48 This pro-
portionality test implies continuing judicial oversight and once again
imports into the corporate contract an additional term: namely, that
the powers given to management by the charter be used to promote
shareholder interests. In this light, fiduciary restraints constitute not
prophylactic prohibitions, but side constraints that limit otherwise
open-ended or overbroad contractual provisions. As recent Delaware
decisions have shown, the Delaware courts will at some point require
that a pill be redeemed. 149
The poison pill provides a paradigm of a novel contractual provi-
sion that can arguably be used either to maximize shareholder wealth
or to entrench existing management-depending on how it is used. In
such a setting, the choice between a plain meaning approach (as New
York adopted) or a proportionality test (as Delaware follows) will usu-
ally determine the permissibility of the provision.
II. GOOD FAITH AND FIDUCIARY STANDARDS COMPARED
To what extent does the duty of good faith imposed by contract
law differ from the duty of loyalty imposed by fiduciary law? Suppose
one were to start with a devil's advocate assertion that the core fiduciary
duties of corporate law are essentially context-specific applications of
contract law's duty of good faith-applications that, to be sure, are the
product of much institutional learning and refinement, but still reflect
the same basic moral attitudes that apply to general commercial deal-
ing. This assertion quickly encounters a problem: the two bodies of
law originated from very different sources, with fiduciary law develop-
ing in equity courts and contract doctrines in common-law courts. 150
Still, the significance of this point is open to question. Their differing
origins may only make more important their fundamental convergence
on some critical questions.
Comparing the two doctrines, one notes immediately several areas
of convergence. First, the duty of good faith is clearly a universal and
146. 500 A.2d 1346.
147. See id. at 1357.
148. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
149. See Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1988);
City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988).
150. See DeMott, supra note 1, at 880-85.
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mandatory feature of contract law.15 1 For example, section 205 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that every contract imposes
an obligation of good faith and fair dealing on the parties. 152 Similarly,
section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) contains a
similar provision. 153 Other, more specific obligations to act in good
faith are scattered throughout the U.C.C.' 54 Indeed, at least one com-
mentator has concluded that the U.C.C. was deliberately phrased in
"open-ended" language in order to encourage courts to interpret its
provisions in the "grand style."' 155 Second, neither the duty of good
faith nor fiduciary duty can be negated by a contractual waiver. 156
Third, neither duty's substantive content is wholly determinable at the
time of contracting. Much like fiduciary duty, the duty of good faith is
shaped and affected by postcontracting developments. 157 In these
three respects-universality, nonwaivability, and survival and evolution
throughout the life of the contractual relationship-the duty of good
faith at least roughly parallels fiduciary duty.
But what does "good faith" mean? In U.C.C. section 2-103(l)(b),
good faith is defined (at least for merchants in sales transactions) to
mean "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade."' 5 8 This emphasis on reasonable
standards seems to state an objective standard, which approximates the
duty of care. Similar expressions appear in the case law antedating the
U.C.C. 159 Still, as with other seminal terms.in the law, it may be easier
to define "bad faith" than "good faith." Professor Summers observes
that good faith is essentially "an 'excluder' ... a phrase without general
meaning (or meanings) of its own [that] serves to exclude a wide range
of heterogeneous forms of bad faith."' 160 He then identifies six catego-
ries of "bad faith" in contract performance: evasion of the spirit of the
deal, lack of diligence and slacking off, willfully rendering only "sub-
151. See Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 371 (1980) (citing cases).
152. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1979).
153. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1988).
154. Id. §§ 2-209 official comment 2, 2-306(2), 2-609 official comment 3.
155. Barnes, Toward a Normative Framework for the Uniform Commercial Code,
62 Temple L. Rev. 117, 122-23 (1989).
156. See Burton, supra note 151, at 371.
157. See DeMott, supra note 1, at 893. Under the U.C.C., "[elvery contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement,"
U.C.C. § 1-203. This emphasis on a continuing duty during the performance of the
contract parallels the continuing obligations imposed by fiduciary duties.
158. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b).
159. See Pillois v. Billingsley, 179 F.2d 205, 207 (2d Cir. 1950); M. O'Neil Supply
Co. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 280 N.Y. 50, 54, 19 N.E.2d 676, 678 (1939);
Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 222 N.Y. 272, 277, 118 N.E. 618, 619
(1918).
160. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195, 201 (1968).
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stantial" performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, abuse of a
power to determine compliance and interference with or failure to co-
operate in the other party's performance.1 61 These examples cover
much of the waterfront of fiduciary duties and in particular suggest that
"good faith" includes some of the duty of care as well as that of
loyalty. 162
Other contract theorists have developed a more unified theory of
good faith performance, under which its central role arises in contrac-
tual arrangements in which one party is accorded substantial discretion
to specify certain terms in the contract. 163 In such a contract, the duty
of good faith constrains the discretion-exercising party and protects the
other dependent party by preventing the first party from recapturing
opportunities forgone upon entering the contract. Of course, this is
exactly the position of management, upon whom the corporate charter
typically delegates vast discretion and on whom fiduciary law essentially
imposes the obligation to use that discretion only for shareholder
wealth-maximizing purposes.' 64 In this light, Professor DeMott has
shown that some well-known corporate fiduciary cases involving a duty
to warn could have been equally well decided under the rubric of good
faith.' 65
The duty of good faith has been used by courts in some corporate
cases in which a traditional fiduciary relationship did not exist in order
to reach an equivalent result. 166 For example, in Pittsburgh Terminal
161. Id. at 232-43.
162. For example, lack of diligence or slacking off is in substance a duty of care
violation.
163. For example, in a typical requirements or output contract one party deter-
mines the quantity to be sold or purchased, but is subject to a duty of good faith in so
doing. See Burton, supra note 151, at 380-81.
164. For example, hornbook fiduciary law does not allow directors to compete with
their companies. R. Clark, Corporate Law 223 (1986). The opportunity to compete can
be seen as one that was forgone upon acceptance of a fiduciary position; the duty of
good faith under Professor Burton's analysis would not permit this opportunity to be
recaptured. Burton, supra note 151, at 403.
165. See DeMott, supra note 1, at 893. For example, she points out that in one
famous case, two corporations shared a common director who was also the controlling
stockholder of one of them. See Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y.
483,485, 121 N.E. 378, 378 (1918). The director negotiated a requirements contract on
behalf of his controlled corporation with the other corporation, knowing that its terms
gave the former an unfair advantage. See id. at 486-88, 121 N.E. at 378-79. Further,
he encouraged the directors of the other company to approve the contract, although he
himself abstained. See id. at 487-88, 121 N.E. at 379. As Professor DeMott points out,
the injured corporation was essentially exploited by the director's failure to disclose his
intention to increase substantially the operation of his mill, thereby expanding its re-
quirements. This easily could have constituted bad faith under the conventional con-
tract law applicable to requirements contracts. See DeMott, supra note 1, at 898-99.
166. The prevailing rule in corporate law is that directors do not owe a fiduciary
duty to bondholders. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 788 (Del. Ch. 1987),
aff'd, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988). In the Delaware case that most clearly articulated this
rule, the Delaware Supreme Court found that, even if no fiduciary duty was owed, the
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Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,167 the Third Circuit held that an is-
suer that failed to provide effective notice of a restructuring to holders
of its convertible debentures violated the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The corporation, it said, "[a]s a matter of New
York contract law, . . .had a duty to speak."' 68 This duty to speak is
probably not as a broad as its classic formulation in fiduciary cases, 169
and there is some evidence that it will be read relatively narrowly in the
public corporation context.1 70 Still, the area of their overlap seems
substantial.
What then are the differences between the two duties? Professor
Eisenberg in substance argues that fiduciary duty protects the share-
holder's "fair expectations," while good faith focuses more narrowly on
the shareholder's contractual rights.' 7 ' In the limited context of close
corporations that he is discussing, this seems an overstatement both
because there are at least some decisions that seem to have considered
the shareholder's reasonable expectations to be part of the contractual
bargain, 172 and because the source of this "fair expectations" principle
conduct alleged to have been a fiduciary breach might still have been fraudulent, and so
it reversed the lower court's dismissal of the action. See Harff v. Kerkorian, 347 A.2d
133, 134 (Del. 1975), rev'g 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974). The message appears to be
that the duty of good faith will sometimes overlap with fiduciary duties.
167. 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
168. Id. at 941; see also Van Gemert v.'Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir.
1977) (contractual obligation to debenture holders breached by failure to provide ade-
quate notice of calling of debenture).
169. Under prevailing contract law principles, an obligation may be implied only
"in.aid and furtherance of other terms of the agreement of the parties." Sabetay v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 335, 506 N.E.2d 919, 922, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 212
(1987). Thus, a duty cannot easily be implied where it would contradict other express
terms in the charter, and another term in the charter that the implied term aided or
furthered would need to be identified.
170. The Second Circuit has applied the parol evidence rule strictly in interpreting
a bond indenture's provision because of the need it perceived for uniformity and cer-
tainty in the securities markets concerning the meaning of standard terms. See Sharon
Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983). This rule, however, seems likely to be applied strictly on
these grounds only in the case of a publicly traded company. Thus, because fiduciary
duties are usually applied more strictly in the close corporation setting, there is again a
parallel between fiduciary duty and the duty of good faith in the similarly varying stan-
dards that they apply to public and close corporations. See Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 592-97, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-17 (1975) ("Stockholders
in close corporations must discharge their management and stockholder responsibilities
in conformity with [a] strict good faith standard.").
171. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1468.
172. See In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 34, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1980)
("These reasonable expectations constitute the bargain of the parties in light of which
subsequent conduct must be appraised."). Dissolution cases in New York have also em-
phasized that an objective standard must be used in determining the shareholder's rea-
sonable expectations. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 73, 473
N.E.2d 1173, 1179, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799, 805 (1984). In addition, some cases have ruled
that only expectations communicated or known to the other side may be relied upon.
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is in any event primarily statutory.1 73' Arguably, these cases are best
read as evidence that all duties-whether contractual or fiduciary in na-
ture-will be interpreted more expansively in the close corporation or
partnership context than in a case involving a simple sale of fungible
goods. Nonetheless, it remains true that in the public-corporation con-
text some courts have viewed the duty of good faith restrictively and
refused to go beyond the express terms of the contract, even if reason-
able expectations seemed to have been frustrated.1 74 Thus, while it
might be hoped that courts would give a fuller content to the duty of
good faith in leveraged buyouts and similar transactions that injure
bondholders, a positive account must recognize that both broad and
narrow readings have been given to the duty in this context. 175 At
present, the law on the meaning of good faith in the bond covenant
context is unsettled, but there is at least reason to believe that some
bondholders' expectations, recognizable to most objective observers,
will not be protected.1 76
Overshadowing all these contextual differences, however, is the
See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 298, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (1983). By
emphasizing an objective standard known to the other side, these cases appear to mimic
the standards of contract law in order to avoid a subjective body of law.
173. Some 37 states now have an oppression statute, which authorizes dissolution
or other relief if the minority shareholder's reasonable expectations are frustrated.
Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders" Reasonable Expectations, 66
Wash. U.L.Q. 193, 206 n.57 (1988). Professor Eisenberg cites the well-known Meiselman
case as an illustration of differing fiduciary and contractual standards. See Eisenberg,
supra note 1, at 1468 (citing Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551). Yet, as he ac-
knowledges, a North Carolina statute broadly authorizes liquidation when "'reasonably
necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of [a] complaining shareholder.' "
Id. (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982)). Thus, it is a false parallel to contrast
the narrower standards of contract law with the broader remedies of fiduciary law, when
in fact the broader remedy is statutory.
174. See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 957-58 (5th Cir.) (en
banc) (postmerger rights of convertible debenture holders limited to express terms of
indenture), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 965 (1981); Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found.
v. Empire Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rights of debenture holders
grounded in clear meaning of indenture), vacated on other grounds, 754 F.2d 478,
480-82 (2d Cir. 1985). But see Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1383-84 (2d
Cir.) (due notice of redemption required to protect reasonable expectations of deben-
ture holders), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975).
175. For a discussion of these two rival traditions in interpreting the implied rights
of bondholders, see Bratton, supra note 39, at 148-49 ("burden of specificity [should
be] on the party who seeks to disrupt settled expectations"); see also Bratton, The Eco-
nomics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 667, 684, 692.
176. Leveraged buyouts, most notably the one undertaken by RJR-Nabisco in 1987,
have had a dramatically adverse effect on bondholders, who have in several recent in-
stances brought suit on the theory that a duty of good faith owed them was breached.
These cases remain pending at this point. See Logan & Lamb, Pending Bondholder
Suits Could Have Broad Ramifications, N.Y.L.J.,June 5, 1989, at 37, col. 4. In contrac-
tual terms, it can be argued that in these cases there was an "omission" in the bondhold-
ers' contract because neither side anticipated the possibility of leveraged buyouts at the
time the debt was issued. See supra note 15.
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major dispute separating contractarians from proponents of fiduciary
analysis. Put simply, fiduciary law is deeply intertwined with notions of
morality and the desire to preserve a traditional form of relationship.
One side believes deeply in the moral tradition of the fiduciary relation-
ship, while the other is equally convinced of the justice of its libertarian
position that the parties should be the sovereign masters of their own
relationship.
What is there then in traditional fiduciary law from which rational
parties might wish to deviate? The traditional fiduciary ethic insists
that the fiduciary act selflessly.' 77 At bottom, the anticontractarians be-
lieve not only that beneficiaries desire such a relationship, but that a
public morality requires its preservation. Two visions of society here
collide: the individualistic, wealth-maximizing view of the economist
and the communitarian ethic of the moralist. In contract law, a discre-
tion-exercising party may often act in a self-interested fashion. Good
faith and self-interested behavior are not mutually exclusive. Con-
versely, fiduciary duty's requirement of undivided loyalty permits the
fiduciary to consider only the beneficiary's interests. Any unauthorized
profit received by the fiduciary must be surrendered to the beneficiary,
even if the receipt in no way harms the beneficiary. 178 In Judge
Cardozo's famous statement, the fiduciary is "held to something
stricter than the morals of the market-place" and must instead abide by
"the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive."179
This central conceptual difference, that a contracting party may
seek to advance his own interests in good faith while a fiduciary may
not, also helps explain a number of procedural differences between the
two duties. For example, the burden is on the fiduciary to prove the
fairness of any transaction engaged in with the trust estate, while in a
contract case the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the other
contracting party did not act in good faith.' 80 Similarly, a party who
breaches a duty of good faith is liable for damages that are essentially
measured by the victim's losses, while fiduciaries are often liable for the
victim's losses plus their own gains, if greater.' 8 '
177. For a classic statement of this ethic, see Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5
(1944) ("The fiduciary must subordinate his individual and private interests to his duty
... whenever the two conflict."). If this means that the fiduciary can never consider his
own costs, reductio ad absurdum results can follow easily. Fiduciary law also has been in-
herently prophylactic, while contract law has not. See Rice v. Davis, 136 Pa. 439, 443, 20
A. 513, 514 (1890) ("The rule is not intended to be remedial of actual wrong, but pre-
ventive of the possibility of it.").
178. See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1951) (holding trustee liable for
gains realized by several employees through trading in bonds of the bankrupt firm, even
though no actual harm resulted from their activities).
179. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
180. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 360 comment b (1981). For a dis-
cussion of this point, see DeMott, supra note 1, at 900.
181. See ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommenda-
tions § 7.16 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1989).
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Incomplete as this descriptive account of the differences between
the duty of good faith and fiduciary duty undoubtedly is, it is sufficient
to frame the central policy question: should the mandatory minimum in
corporate law be set at or near the level of the duty of good faith with
the fuller, more selfless requirements of traditional fiduciary duty being
treated as default rules? Under such a structure, corporate law would
by no means be wholly enabling, but some opting out by contractual
provision would be permissible. In effect, the zone between the duty of
good faith and the higher fiduciary standard of selflessness would be-
come negotiable.
At first glance, such a proposal seems to force one to choose be-
tween the perspectives of the economist and the moralist. But this is an
oversimplification. One can accept the proposition that morality
should play a role in commercial life and still object that traditional
fiduciary duties represent, at least in some respects, the wrong moral-
ity-one geared to the preindustrial, hierarchical society in which they
developed, but not the entrepreneurial and egalitarian society of the
late twentieth century. It is not accidental that fiduciary law refers to
the employee-agent as the "servant" and the employer-principal as the
"master." What is questionable, however, is whether contemporary
law wishes to maintain this hierarchical distinction in a changed and
changing business environment.18 2
The normative case for a limited right to "opt out" of some aspects
of fiduciary duty can be defended on two grounds. First, the corpora-
tion is very dissimilar from the other relationships in which fiduciary
law provides the operative and mandatory legal standards. Unlike the
relationships between trustee and beneficiary or guardian and ward, the
corporation is a long-term entrepreneurial relationship among eco-
nomic actors whom society wishes to encourage to accept risk. As a
relational contract, it is also understood that many of its terms will be
modified over its duration. Even more importantly, the modem man-
ager has no realistic alternative but to accept employment within the
corporate form of business organization. Because there is no other fea-
sible vehicle for conducting business activity on a sizable scale, the
manager is locked into a legal relationship that, at least in theory, can-
not be modified. This contrasts with the numerous alternatives to the
trust device. For example, an investment manager need not become a
trustee for his clients, but can enter into an advisory contract. As a
result, by imposing the fiduciary label on corporate managers, we may
require an involuntary level of selflessness, at least if we take the con-
cept of fiduciary duty seriously. All this leads to a fundamental point:
182. I have elsewhere criticized the overbreadth of fiduciary duties in the context of
rights in information as potentially chilling employee mobility. See Coffee, HUSH!:
The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter and the
Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 121 (1988).
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the manager should have a limited but legitimate right to act self-inter-
estedly in some contexts, most notably with respect to corporate
control. ' 8 3
Second, shareholders, who are typically diversified, are arguably
less exposed to loss than managers, who are largely undiversified and
have substantial equity exposed to firm-specific risk.18 4 Indeed, it is at
least debatable whether the relationship between arbitragers, or other
short-term speculative holders buying in the secondary market, and
corporate managements should be viewed as even resembling the clas-
sic form of fiduciary relationship in which one side clearly reposes its
trust and confidence in the other. Compared to other legal relation-
ships that are not generally considered to be fiduciary in character and
thus are policed by the duty of good faith, the stockholder-manager
relationship in the modem public corporation does not at first blush
clearly justify more exacting standards of performance. For example,
the relationship between a requirements purchaser and its supplier, or
between an output seller and its customer, can be one in which the
party accorded discretion over the quantity term possesses at least as
much power as the corporate manager; the dependent party is at least
as vulnerable as the shareholder in the manager-shareholder relation-
ship. In fact, the dependent party in such a requirements or output
contract is far less likely to be diversified than the modern shareholder,
who is rapidly becoming an institutional investor. Much the same point
can be made about the relationship between franchisers and franchis-
ees and a variety of other specialized relationships. Yet, all these rela-
tionships are primarily governed by the duty of good faith.
To be sure, the claim that opportunism today is at least potentially
bilateral, with shareholders able to breach implicit contracts with man-
agement,18 5 should not be used to free managers from their obligations
to make full disclosure or deal fairly with their corporations. However,
the duty of good faith can enforce these obligations. The real issue is
whether the law must always seek to do more and always force manag-
183. This point was earlier made-by Professor William Klein. See Klein, The Mod-
em Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 Yale LJ. 1521, 1543
(1982). More recently, economists have begun to model corporate governance from the
premise that the manager has a legitimate interest in control. See Grossman & Hart,
One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 175,
176-77 (1988).
184. See Demsetz & Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and
Consequences, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1155, 1159 (1985).
185. For the argument that takeovers can breach implicit contracts by which man-
agers were promised deferred compensation and a "settling up" adjustment, see
Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents and Hostile Tender Offers, 76 Am.
Econ. Rev. 155, 159-61 (1986). I have surveyed this theme elsewhere. See Coffee,
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporation Web, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1,
23-24, 73-81 (1986).
1660 [Vol. 89:1618
THE JUDICIAL ROLE
ers to -subordinate their self-interest to the interests of their
shareholders.
Three examples will help illustrate my concerns about the over-
breadth of traditional fiduciary ideology. First, consider the position of
a CEO of a major corporation who believes his corporation will soon be
the target of a takeover. The CEO can, of course, remain passive and
accept the takeover, or he can resist, on the ground that he is protect-
ing shareholders from coercion. But can the CEO make his own pre-
emptive leveraged buyout proposal? To be sure, this happens all the
time, but is it really consistent with the classic fiduciary ethic under
which the fiduciary must not act out of self-interest and should not
profit? Only with considerable conceptual strain can the fiduciary's evi-
dent self-interest be rationalized. A strict adherence to fiduciary theory
might require that the CEO not make his own buyout proposal, but
instead propose a financial restructuring or corporate self-tender that
would produce precisely the same recapitalized financial structure,
without receiving any additional equity. In fact, in the aftermath of the
1988 leveraged buyout proposal by the senior management of RJR-
Nabisco, many have questioned whether such transactions are consis-
tent with fiduciary duties. Arguably, managers who perceive a better
way to run the firm should be obligated to share their recommenda-
tions with the board, not propose to buy the firm in order to profit by
putting their ideas into operation.
The problem with insisting on such selflessness in this context,
however, is that it ignores the inevitable relationship of risk and return.
Restructurings and buyouts necessarily involve a heightened risk of
bankruptcy. Diversified shareholders can view the risk with relative
equanimity, but undiversified managers, who may have substantial firm-
specific human capital invested in the firm, cannot. Thus, heightened
risk necessitates a heightened return, or the managerial labor market is
thrown into disequilibrium. Moreover, the cost of fiduciary ideology
here can be high because, unless the gains from higher leverage can be
shared with management, management will predictably not propose
such transactions for the corporation on any terms. In this context, if
the gains cannot be shared with managers, there often will be no gains.
Second, consider the classic corporate opportunity doctrine. Tra-
ditionally, it requires the" fiduciary to turn over to the firm certain busi-
ness opportunities that come to the fiduciary, at least if they fall within
an ill-defined zone in which the firm is said to have an "expectancy."' i 6
Suppose a group of individuals wishes to form a corporation to exploit
oil and gas properties within a given region. Assume that one of its
186. See Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 224-25, 222 N.W.2d 71, 81 (1974) (adopt-
ing two-step approach that finds the corporation to have an expectancy in those business
opportunities within its "line of business"). For a critique of the confusion inherent in
Miller's elaborate approach, see Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportuni-
ties, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 998, 1012-16 (1981).
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members, who has unique expertise, will join this venture only if the
corporate charter provides that he may continue to exploit business op-
portunities coming to him in the same area. Should such a charter pro-
vision be enforceable when otherwise a given business opportunity
presented to him would be deemed by a court to belong to the corpora-
tion because of his fiduciary status? I8 7 If classic fiduciary theory con-
trols, the provision would seem unenforceable. But should that theory
control? A selfless theory of fiduciary obligation may simply drive this
director off the board.
How different would a good faith standard be? Under a good faith
standard, as implemented by a charter provision, corporate officials
would still be required to disclose any opportunity that came to them in
an official capacity, but opportunities encountered within a personal
sphere of behavior would not be similarly regulated. To be sure, there
is a cost here because it is difficult to monitor how opportunities are
discovered, but a properly drafted charter provision could require dis-
closure to the board of any opportunity so pursued.
A final example begins with a recent Seventh Circuit decision, writ-
ten by Judge Easterbrook, concerning the disclosure obligation that a
corpoiation incurs as a matter of fiduciary law in repurchasing its
shares from an employee. In Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc.,188 the corpo-
ration was entitled, pursuant to a shareholders' agreement, to repur-
chase the shares of a retiring employee.189 But was it obligated to
disclose to such employee the fact that it was about to enter into a
merger at a high premium (with the possible result that he might not
then retire)? The Seventh Circuit said yes, based on fiduciary duties
that it found the corporation owed to the employee. 190 As a result, the
decision has posed a significant practical problem for the bar: does a
corporation that reserves the right to buy back its stock under these
circumstances surrender its control over the timing of its disclosures?
For a corporation with hundreds of such shareholder-employees, an
obligation to disclose before repurchasing shares from retiring or de-
187. Cases have divided as to whether such an opportunity presented to a director
in his "individual" capacity is a corporate opportunity that must be turned over to the
corporation. The prevailing view seems to be that the opportunity must be turned over
if it is closely associated with an existing or prospective activity of the corporation. See
Goodman v. Perpetual Bldg. Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 20, 37 (D.D.C. 1970); Rosenblum v.
Judson Eng'g Corp., 99 N.H. 267, 271-72, 109 A.2d 558, 562-63 (1954); Note, Corpo-
rate Opportunity, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 765 (1961). Judson Engineering is the prevailing rule
today. But see Weiss v. Kay Jewelry Stores, Inc., 470 F.2d 1259, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64, 79 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 198
F.2d 697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 909 (1952).
I agree thatJudson Engineering provides the optimal default rule, but I would permit
some contracting out from it. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
188. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988). For a
critique of this decision, see DeMott, supra note 1, at 916-21.
189. See id. at 432.
190. See id. at 435.
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parting employees would eventually force it to reveal important pend-
ing developments prematurely in a manner that could injure it.
Accordingly, law firms have already drawn up waiver agreements under
which the employees waive their right to full disclosure at the time of
repurchase.' 9 ' But if the disclosure provision is a matter of fiduciary
obligation, can the fiduciary ask the beneficiary to waive its right to full
disclosure? Would this not constitute another example of impermissi-
ble opting out? In all likelihood, courts will uphold such waivers, be-
cause the legitimacy of the corporation's need to control disclosure
timing seems clear, and such agreements do not appear to be opportu-
nistic attempts to overreach the employee.' 92 Yet, in so doing, courts
would be essentially equating the duty of good faith and fiduciary duty
in this context. 193
These examples have been intended to suggest that strong utilitar-
ian and even plausible moral justifications support some modifications
of traditional fiduciary duties. Counterarguments are, of course, fore-
seeable. Some may argue that greater tolerance would produce com-
mercial uncertainty, that it would burden the courts, that few
innovations have real utility and that skilled draftsmen can avoid most
mandatory rules anyway. On a political level, the claim can also be
made that arguments for relaxation should be addressed to the legisla-
ture, which certainly has responded with alacrity to the 'corporate
lobby's pleas for assistance with respect to other recent issues of corpo-
rate governance.' 94 Although these arguments have some merit, they
191. See Wander, Pallesen & Kunetka, Shareholder Agreements: A Disclosure
Trap for the Unwary?, Insights, June 1989, at 13-14 (setting forth model waiver
provision).,
192. Judge Easterbrook is clear that he believes there can be a contractual waiver of
the new fiduciary duty he creates. See Jordan, 815 F.2d at 436 ("We may assume that
duties concerning the timing of disclosure by an otherwise-silent firm also may be the
subject of contract."). Also, Illinois law provides that a shareholders' agreement will be
upheld unless contrary to public policy. See Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 22-27, 203
N.E.2d 577, 581-83 (1965) (agreements should be invalidated'on grounds of public
policy only when court finds clear statutory conflict, fraud or corrupt or dangerous ten-
dencies evident on face of agreement).
193. A fair reading of Jordan is that Judge Easterbrook simply found an implied
term in the relationship that the stock would not be bought back in an opportunistic
fashion. It seems highly doubtful that he intended to attach the full consequences of
traditional fiduciary duty to this employer-employee relationship.
194. For example, the vast majority of the states have now enacted legislation au-
thorizing charter provisions that exculpate directors from due-care liability. See, e.g.,
Del. Code Ann., tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14A:2-7(3) (Supp.
1989). Virtually all of these statutes were passed since the 1985 decision in Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See Hanks, supra note 134, at 1209. Such alacrity
certainly suggests that political reform of outdated corporate law is possible. Yet the
argument that corporations can seek relief from the legislature fails to recognize that
lobbying pressure typically develops only for "reforms" numerous corporations want. A
true innovation almost by definition will be unable to attract broad political support
because there will be no demand for it until experience with it develops.
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are really responses to the broader claim that corporate law should be
wholly enabling. The freedom here contemplated is marginal and
bounded by a duty of good faith and by a requirement of transaction
specificity195 that would leave the law applicable to most traditional
self-dealing transactions unchanged. As others have stressed, the duty
of good faith reduces the costs of contracting, including the costs of
investigating one's prospective partners, negotiating the transaction
and bearing risk with respect to the future.196
At best, calling officers and directors fiduciaries only begins the
analysis and sometimes clouds it, unless we focus clearly on the end to
be achieved. As observed earlier, the problem with an unqualified hy-
pothetical bargaining approach to the issue of contractual freedom is
that it can result in distributive unfairness, even as it achieves alloca-
tional efficiency, because provisions that maximize aggregate value can
still result in an unanticipated loss for some. Here, the irony must be
confronted that an unthinking loyalty to fiduciary ideology can some-
times have the same impact. In particular, corporate control transac-
tions have the potential to visit losses on some, even as they maximize
value on an aggregate basis. Thus, if we believe that distributive fair-
ness should remain a constraint on the pursuit of efficiency in one con-
text, consistency requires that it similarly justify charter provisions that
conflict with classic fiduciary theory-at least if there is a coherent case
that such provisions intend to achieve a "fair" allocation of gains and
losses. Properly interpreted, the duty of good faith could largely cap-
ture this concept.
III. STANDARDS FOR OPTING OUT
What would a rule look like that permitted contractual innovations
that departed from the traditional norms of corporate governance? For
committed partisans on both sides of this issue, the answer is easy. The
thoroughgoing contractarian would enforce any provision adopted by
shareholders, except possibly those adopted under circumstances in-
volving fraud or coercion, while the anticontractarian would tolerate
only the most modest deviations from corporate housekeeping rules.
But, for those willing to consider an intermediate position, the follow-
ing proposed "black-letter" rule provides an exploratory vehicle by
which to examine possible trade-offs between the desire to permit inno-
vation and the fear of opportunism:
A court should uphold and give effect to a contractual provision.
that would otherwise be deemed invalid as in conflict with the corporate
law of the jurisdiction if and only if:
(1) the provision does not
(A) reduce or restrict the obligation of persons occupying
195. See infra notes 206-18 and accompanying text.
196. See Burton, supra note 151, at 393.
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a fiduciary relatibnship to the corporation to deal
fairly and act in good faith; or
(B) conflict with the clear purpose of any statutory provi-
sion or with an established public policy intended to
protect persons or interests other than shareholders;
(2) either the provision
(A) is sufficiently specific and limited in its application
that the parties reasonably could appreciate its likely
impact at the time they approved it; or
(B) amounts to the substitution of an adequate alterna-
tive procedure that the parties reasonably could be-
lieve would better serve their interests; and
(3) if the provision was adopted by a charter amendment, it was
approved by a disinterested majority of the shareholders under
circumstances where a rejection of the amendment would not
cause them to be worse off than they were prior to the proposal
of the amendment.
In effect, there are five basic limitations stated in this attempted
"black-letter" rule: (1) the contractual provision may not reduce the
fiduciary's obligations below the level that the duty of good faith would
require; (2) the provision must not conflict with the "plain meaning" of
any statute; (3) it must have sufficient specificity to permit the parties to
"price" the difference between the provision and the normally applica-
ble legal rule; (4) if the provision substitutes a remedy, it must amount
to an adequate substitute, rather than simply a waiver; and (5) in the
case of a charter amendment, the provision must receive disinterested
shareholder approval under circumstances that were not coercive.
Each of these proposed elements will be briefly examined.
A. The Duty of Good Faith
As previously emphasized, contractual freedom logically can mean
no more than the freedom to contract to the extent permitted by the
law of contracts. Thus, it follows that no exculpatory provision or other
provision should be tolerated that abridges the duty of good faith. Be-
cause the U.C.C. defines the duty of good faith to include a duty of fair
dealing, a tolerance for innovation does not mean that an officer or
director could enter into transactions with the corporation on unfair
terms. In effect, little would change in terms of the traditional fiduciary
law on self-dealing. 197
197. Clearly, even under a good faith regime, Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F.
Supp. 687 (D. Colo. 1972), aff'd in relevant part, 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974), would continue to represent the law in its statement that
"[elxculpatory provisions of corporate articles create no license to steal." Id. at 701. A
closer question would be presented by Pappas y. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 867-68 (3d Cir.
1968), which refused to accept a shifting burden of proof. Already, there is a suggestion
in Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 236-37, 43 N.E.2d 18, 22 (1942), that a charter
provision could shift a presumption. Under the standards proposed in this section,
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B. The "Plain Meaning" Rule and Third-Party Limitations
Legislative supremacy is a basic fact of political life, and thus when
the literal text of a statute is clear on its face and is not contradicted by
its legislative history, courts may not decline to follow it. Virtually all
commentators agree with this assertion, but disputes arise when the lit-
eral meaning of the statute is seemingly contradicted by its legislative
history. The Supreme Court has recognized that the "plain meaning"
rule need not necessarily be followed in such a case. 198 Even more dif-
ficult issues of statutory interpretation arise when the claim is made that
the legislative intent of a statute can be reinterpreted in light of
changed circumstances and later developments.' 99
In reality, however, it is difficult to find many cases in which the
"plain meaning" of a statute necessarily compelled the invalidation of a
charter provision.200 More typically, a process of judicial inference
about the statute's policy has provoked the invalidation. The board
sterilization cases discussed earlier 20' provide a useful illustration. In a
case such as McQuade v. Stoneham,20 2 it was hardly self-evident that the
salary arrangement specified in the shareholders' agreement deprived
the board of its legally delegated jurisdiction, and other cases have sub-
sequently reached contrary results.203 Similarly, the willingness of
most courts to tolerate the chilling of cumulative voting through char-
ter provisions suggests that courts need not strain to find conflicts be-
tween a statute and a charter provision. 20 4 Hence, because section 1 (B)
of the rule proposed above essentially requires a frontal conflict be-
tween the statute and the charter provision before the latter is invali-
dated, this restriction will seldom come into play.
The third-party limitation in section I(B) is also largely self-ex-
planatory. Corporate law contains a few provisions intended to benefit
third parties (creditors, employees, etc.). An example is section 630 of
charter provisions could only shift the burden with respect to specific, defined
transactions.
198. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987); United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940).
199. See, e.g., Farber, Statutory Interpretation and the Principle of Legislative
Supremacy (forthcoming 78 Geo. LJ. (1989)) (arguing for a cypres approach to statutory
interpretation). Some decisions do appear to have so reinterpreted old statutes. See Li
v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226. 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Les-
bian/Gay Freedom Day Comm. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd sub
nom. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
200. See cases cited supra note 21. Even among these cases, some involve ajudi-
cial inference either as to the purpose of the statute or the purpose of the charter provi-
sion. Cf. Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338, 347 (Del. 1957) (finding true purpose of
stock pooling agreement to be the creation of an illegal voting trust).
201. See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
202. 263 N.Y. 323, 329, 189 N.E. 234, 236 (1934).
203. See Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390, 404-11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
831 (1967); Caller v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 33-34, 203 N.E.2d 577, 587 (1964).
204. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
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the New York Business Corporation Law, which makes the ten largest
shareholders of a New York corporation liable for certain employee
wages. 20 5 Obviously, shareholder innovation is less justifiable when
the result is to shift costs to absent third parties than when it reallocates
costs among the shareholders themselves.
C. The Transaction-Specificity Requirement
In the absence of face-to-face bargaining, pricing is only feasible if
the parties can clearly understand what rights are being surrendered
and how they will affect particular transactions. The problem here is
not just that pricing will be inaccurate in the context of a long-term,
open-ended relationship, but also that past behavior and experience
may no longer serve as an accurate guide by which to estimate the im-
pact of the provision. For example, consider an exculpatory charter
provision, which would free management from certain fiduciary liabili-
ties. The attempt to price its effect ex ante is confounded by the fact
that its existence may change management's future behavior. The
shareholders are in much the same position as the seller of an insur-
ance policy: just as a person insured against property loss may take
fewer precautions to preserve the insured property, so might the corpo-
rate official who is now protected against due care liability spend less
time in monitoring corporate subordinates. In short, there is a moral
hazard problem. 20 6
The problem of pricing charter provisions has two sides. First, one
cannot accurately price a new corporate governance provision by sim-
ply looking to past experience, at least when the adoption of the provi-
sion may change future behavior. Insurance companies understand
this and solve their problem through minimum deductible and coinsur-
ance provisions, which impose some of the risk on the insured.20 7
Within the corporate context, the optimal answer is probably bonding
provisions by which managers guarantee their performance. To date,
although such provisions have been much discussed in theory, they
have been seldom observed in practice. 208 Conversely, the other side
of the problem is that one cannot simply assume the worst and reduce
the value of the shares by the maximum possible loss if management
(or some other group receiving unreviewable discretion under the char-
205. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 630 (McKinney 1986).
206. The author has discussed this problem elsewhere at greater length. See
Coffee, supra note 4, at 944-48. Ultimately, the end result may be a "market for
lemons."
207. In this regard, remember ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis
and Recommendations § 7.17 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1989) leaves some financial risk on the
director or officer that cannot be exculpated by a charter provision. See supra note 135
and accompanying text.
208. Coffee, supra note 4, at 942-43; see also Brudney, supra note 1, at 1422-23 &
n.49 (discussing problems associated with attempts to tie managerial discretion and per-
formance to market mechanisms).
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ter provision) were to behave in a totally self-interested way. Most indi-
viduals are constrained by a variety of nonlegal forces (e.g., personal
morality, market forces, a desire to preserve reputational capital), and
thus it would be an excessive discount to assume that the worst will
always happen. Thus, whatever the price the market places on such a
general provision, it will often be inaccurate.
Transaction specificity is an alternative answer to this problem.
When the opt-out provision is limited to a specific transaction, the mar-
ket can judge more accurately the likely diversion of funds that has
been authorized. The difference here is between a pricing process that
seeks to estimate the long-term risk that management will divert assets
to itself and one that values what is presently being taken. In the latter
case, pricing is easier because the risk is effectively 100%o, and the mar-
ket must value only the diverted property itself.
Although transaction-specific departures from the norms of corpo-
rate governance thus can be theoretically distinguished from other at-
tempts at contracting out, this point is of only academic significance if
courts will not accept such a distinction. Yet, a plausible case can be
made that courts intuitively have sensed this distinction, and some deci-
sions clearly have shown more tolerance for deviations from the strict
rules of fiduciary duty that were transaction-specific. Two decisions will
illustrate:
First, in Nelkin v. H.J.R. Really Corp. ,209 several tenants of an indus-
trial building purchased the building in 1941 and entered into a share-
holders' agreement permitting occupancy of their space at less than fair
rental value. Over time, the property appreciated in value substantially,
but half of the tenants moved out for a variety of reasons. Seeking to
realize their share ,of the substantial value of the property upon a sale
or liquidation, these ex-tenant shareholders brought suit in 1968 seek-
ing ajudicial dissolution. They alleged that the majority was "continu-
ing the existence of the corporation solely for their own benefit and
that, therefore, the corporation should be dissolved. 210 Yet, because
the shareholders' agreement clearly contemplated a below-market rent
(which was to be charged equally to all shareholder tenants on a square
foot basis), the New York Court of Appeals refused to grant dissolu-
tion.21  This result can be justified on the ground that the shareholders
clearly and specifically contemplated that they were entering into a yen-
209. 25 N.Y.2d 543, 255 N.E.2d 713, 307 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1969). A similar case is
Breswick & Co. v. Harrison-Rye Realty Corp., 2 A.D.2d 769, 770, 154 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626
(1956), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 685, 148 N.E.2d 299, 171 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1958). There, the char-
ter contemplated a nominal rental for a country club that was in reality organized on a
not-for-profit basis.
210. Nelkin, 25 N.Y.2d at 547, 255 N.E.2d at 715, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
211. Id. at 549, 255 N.E.2d at 716, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 458. Chief Judge Fuld dis-
sented, but not on the ground that contractual provisions cannot modify fiduciary du-
ties. Rather, in his view, the shareholders' agreement contemplated that this nonprofit
maximizing arrangement would be continued only so long as all the shareholders re-
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ture designed to promote their mutual interests through running the
corporation as an industrial cooperative, rather than as a profit-maxi-
mizing firm.
A similar case is In re Reading Co.. 2 12 There, at the time they
formed the corporation, all the shareholders of the Trailer Train Com-
pany understood that it would lease its assets at below-market rentals to
its shareholders and would not seek to earn a profit. However, after
one shareholder-Reading Company-terminated its railroad opera-
tions, it sued to force Trailer Train either to dissolve or to pay divi-
dends. It claimed that Trailer Train's leasing of its cars at below-
market rates to its shareholders amounted to unfair self-dealing that
justified dissolution. Rejecting this claim, the Third Circuit explicitly
recognized that contractual provisions could overcome fiduciary duties:
Under Delaware law the rights of stockholders are contractual,
and may be altered by binding agreements between the stock-
holders and the corporation. A purchaser of stock who thus
bargains away part of his rights as a stockholder alters the fidu-
ciary duty of a majority shareholder to him.21 3
In contrast, courts have been far less receptive to charter provi-
sions that sought to approve in advance all future self-dealing transac-
tions between the corporation and its shareholders. 2 14 Such blanket,
ex ante authorizations simply cannot be priced accurately, because
most individuals remain subject to moral constraints, other extralegal
forces, and the need to preserve reputational capital. Because individu-
als thus do not respond to such broad authorizations as if they were a
license to steal, accurate pricing is impossible. In short, when legal
rules are suspended but nonlegal constraints remain, the result is to
create unproductive uncertainty. As a consequence, a legal rule that
precludes charter provisions that are difficult to price is both efficient,
mained tenants. Id. at 550-51, 255 N.E.2d at 717, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 460 (Fuld, J.,
dissenting).
212. 711 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1983). In an impressive forthcoming article, Professor
Robert Thompson also cites In re Reading for the proposition that contracting out must
be limited to specific transactions. See Thompson, The Law's Limits on Contracts in a
Corporation (draft of Nov. 1988 on file at Columbia Law Review). While Professor
Thompson is basically focusing on the closely held firm, I see no adequate reason to
limit opting out to this context, at least when the other elements in my proposed test can
be satisfied.
213. Reading, 711 F.2d at 519 (citations omitted); see also Coleman v. Taub, 638
F.2d 628, 636-38 (3d Cir. 1981) (approving employment contract with majority share-
holder containing stock buy-back that otherwise would be considered a breach of the
shareholders' fiduciary duties).
214. See, e.g., Irwin v. West End Dev. Corp., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo.
1972), aff'd in relevant part, 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158
(1974); Abeles v. Adams Eng'g Co., 35 N.J. 411, 429, 173 A.2d 246, 255 (1961). These
decisions also contrast sharply with cases, such as Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227,
233-34, 43 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1942), in which the charter authorized self-dealing related to
specific intracorporate transactions.
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because it reduces the variance of expected shareholder returns and so
reduces agency costs, and consistent with morality, because provisions
that are open-ended invite greater departures from fundamental
morality.
What kinds of departures from traditional norms would be permit-
ted by such a standard? Clearly, the proposed transaction-specificity
requirement would not permit charter provisions that, for example, au-
thorized corporate officials to engage in insider trading. On the other
hand, this standard would not necessarily be offended by a charter pro-
vision that precluded a hostile tender offer. The difference is that the
former cannot be accurately priced, because one does not know how
much trading insiders would engage in, while the takeover premium
can be estimated.
A closer question would be presented by a charter provision that
sought to opt out of the corporate opportunity doctrine or to authorize
corporate officials to engage in competing businesses. 215 Such provi-
sions are common in partnerships, including those syndicated publicly.
Frequently, real estate or oil drilling limited partnerships are sold pub-
licly containing a provision in the partnership agreement authorizing
the general partner to syndicate other offerings to other groups of in-
vestors. The result is that the syndicator will become the general part-
ner of two or more competing pools and will face unavoidable issues
about how to allocate new business opportunities among these pools
(or among the pools and its own business ventures). Typically, the pro-
vision will permit the partner to allocate such opportunities as it deems
fit.
Would such a provision be enforceable if inserted in a corporate
charter? Assume it authorized corporate officials to retain or allocate as
they saw fit business opportunities that they received in their individual
capacity. Although the case law is sparse, one Second Circuit decision,
Burg v. Horn,216 found no liability on the part of promoters of a corpo-
ration that held real estate investments who actively pursued invest-
215. The ALI Corporate Governance Project would permit disinterested directors
or disinterested shareholders to adopt a "standard of the corporation" that would per-
mit specified recurring types of transactions to be approved in advance, which otherwise
might be deemed corporate opportunities. See ALI, Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance: Analysis and Recommendations § 5.09 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1986). Alternatively,
the board could narrowly define the scope of the corporation's business so as to exclude
some activities that a director wished to engage in from the corporate opportunity doc-
trine. See id. illustration 6. Thus, there are a variety of means by which decisions func-
tionally equivalent to opting out can be reached or rationalized.
For a discussion of the corporate opportunity doctrine, see Brudney & Clark, supra
note 186. The authors argue that opting out of the corporate opportunity doctrine
should be permissible in the closely held corporation, but not in the publicly held corpo-
ration. Id. at 1001-02. While I do not doubt that the case for opting out is easier to
make with respect to closely held firms, the prophylactic rule proposed by these authors
strikes me as overbroad.
216. 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967).
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ments for their own account that would have been of interest to their
corporation.2 17 The court's rationale appears to be that the plaintiff
shareholder knew from the outset that the directors would continue to
engage in their own business ventures and thus had implicitly con-
sented.218 This implicit consent theory is troubling, but the distinctive
fact about Burg v. Horn was that, because of the small scale of the corpo-
ration's operations, the investors likely knew that few additional
properties would be directed to their firm by the promoters. In short,
the better rationale for the decision was not implicit consent, but the
specificity of the transactions contemplated.
Arguably, the Burg decision rests on a "what-you-see-is-what-you-
get" rationale. If the investors were promised only the specific assets
they saw and no assurance was given that the promoters would under-
take to provide additional investments, then accurate pricing was possi-
ble because there was no expectation of a continuing, open-ended
fiduciary relationship between the parties. In contrast, if the parties
nonetheless expected such a relationship because of extralegal factors,
such as market pressures or the need to maintain reputational capital,
then we cannot have the same confidence in the accuracy of the pricing
mechanism. In this light, the significance of face-to-face bargaining is
less the consent of the investors than our certainty that nothing more
was promised or reasonably expected.
D. Waivers Versus Substitutes
Even when accurate pricing of the deviation from the normal rules
of corporate governance is not possible because the provision will ap-
ply across a range of future transactions, a charter provision should be
upheld if the parties could reasonably believe that it was an adequate or
superior substitute. Conversely, a simple waiver of fiduciary duties
should not be upheld, unless it can be shown that it was sufficiently
limited to comply with the transaction-specificity requirement discussed
above.
Support for this distinction between permissible substitutions and
impermissible waivers can be found both in the few corporate law deci-
sions involving attempts to substitute a private for a public remedy and
in the law of contracts. The corporate decision most closely on point is
Coleman v. Taub,219 in which the Third Circuit permitted a contractual
provision establishing an appraisal-like proceeding before an arbitra-
tion panel to take precedence over Delaware's statutory appraisal rem-
edy. Coleman's rationale is, however, complicated by the fact that the
Third Circuit did not view the plaintiff as an ordinary shareholder, but
rather as one who by contract had relinquished his entitlement to be
217. Id. at 900-01.
218. Id.
219. 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981).
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the beneficiary of fiduciary duties. 220 Arguably, the court saw the origi-
nal relationship between the shareholder and the corporation as not
creating the status of a "true" shareholder, that is a participant in the
firm's residual earnings. Therefore, it may have been more willing to
accept the substituted contractual regime of remedies in lieu of the stat-
utory remedies provided by the jurisdiction. Still, some case law sup-
ports the proposition that the shareholders in a close corporation may
enter into a buy-sell agreement and make that remedy exclusive,
thereby precluding access to the remedies of judicial dissolution or
appraisal.221
In the close corporation setting, it is also likely that courts will per-
mit an arbitration remedy to override the shareholder's statutory right
to bring a derivative action. Reviewing the recent case law, Professor
Thompson has found several decisions in which courts have stayed pe-
titions for involuntary dissolution pending arbitration2 22 and one deci-
sion in which a court required a plaintiff to arbitrate allegations that
essentially amounted to a breach of the duty of loyalty. 22 3
Outside the close corporation setting, the issues surrounding the
possible substitution of an arbitration proceeding for the derivative ac-
tion are more complex, and I have reviewed them elsewhere. 224 Two
points, however, are relevant here. First, it is difficult to assert that sub-
stituting arbitration for a derivative action by means of a charter provi-
sion necessarily conflicts with the "plain meaning" or legislative intent
underlying any corporation statute. Statutes and policies that forbid
contractual provisions that "sterilize" the board are not necessarily of-
fended by such a charter provision, because historically the board has
had only a modest role in a derivative action. It has been largely a pas-
sive bystander.225 Similarly, although many state corporation codes ex-
pressly authorize derivative actions, these statutes do not necessarily
preclude the parties from resorting instead to arbitration. Indeed, the
precise analogue of this issue was faced this year by the Supreme Court
220. Id. at 637-38.
221. See Rowland v. Rowland, 102 Idaho 534, 541, 633 P.2d 599, 606 (1981);
Capitol Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Miss. 1980). But see In re Pace
Photographers, Ltd., 71 N.Y.2d 737, 747, 525 N.E.2d 713, 718, 530 N.Y.S.2d 67, 72
(1988) (general provision regulating transfer of stock not intended to cover or exclude
oppression remedies). For a fuller treatment of this area, see Thompson, supra note
173, at 231-32.
222. Thompson, supra note 212 (citing In re Stewart Becker Ltd., 94 Misc. 2d 766,
772, 405 N.Y.S.2d 571 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Kaliski v. Rosenberg, 34 A.D.2d 626, 309
N.Y.S.2d 245 (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 27 N.Y.2d 727, 262 N.E.2d 674, 314
N.Y.S.2d 534 (1970); Moskowitz v. Surrey Sleep Products, Inc., 30 A.D.2d 820, 292
N.Y.S.2d 749 (1968) (mem.)).
223. Id. (citing Levy v.Joyce Morris, Inc., 79 A.D.2d 684, 434 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1980)).
224. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 953-70.
225. Arguably, this has changed with the advent of the special litigation committee
and the new emphasis placed on demand.
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in Rodriguez de Quijas v, Shearson/American Express, Inc.,226 in which the
Court overruled a, prior decision holding that mandatory predispute ar-
bitration provisions would not be enforced with respect to causes of
action based on express provisions of the federal securities laws.
22 7
Rodriguez thus stands for the proposition that an express remedy provi-
sion in federal law does not imply a congressional intent to preclude
agreements requiring the use of arbitration.
Ultimately, the more serious issue surrounding the attempted sub-
stitution of arbitration for the derivative action involves the meaning of
an "adequate substitute." A factor that distinguishes the public corpo-
ration from the close corporation is that in the former the plaintiff is
more likely to be a private attorney general, on whose efforts other
shareholders free ride. Imperfect as this system has been,228 arbitra-
tion does not typically seek to resolve more than the individual plain-
tiff's claim. Thus, for example, if the arbitration process ordered that
the individual plaintiff should receive a damage award or have his
shares purchased at a premium over market, this relief would benefit
him but not those who in the past relied (at least in theory) on his en-
forcement effort. To be an adequate substitute, then, an arbitration
remedy must be redesigned so that it parallels the traditional role of
class and derivative actions as a system of quasi-public litigation in
which individual litigants serve in a representative capacity for all
shareholders.
From a contract law perspective, there is even clearer authority for
the proposition that the parties may substitute remedies. Under the
U.C.C., the parties may agree on limitations or restrictions on reme-
dies, or may provide for substitute remedies, but only as long as the
modified remedy does not, in the U.C.C.'s phrase, "fail of its essential
purpose.' 229 In short, even if the corporation is viewed as a private
contract, the principal commercial statute still places limits on the abil-
ity of the parties to substitute remedies by requiring that the modified
or substituted remedy be adequate to achieve its purpose; Although
the case for judicial paternalism is weakest in the commercial law con-
text, it appears to be recognized even here that contractual innovations
which depart from the prevailing rules involve high information costs
and present risks of opportunism. But the answer is not to bar contrac-
226. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
227. Id. at 1919-2 1. In an earlier 1987 decision, Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), the Court decided that it would enforce a contractual
provision requiring arbitration of claims arising under Rule I Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5 (1988), which is ajudicially implied cause of action. Id. at 227-38. The Court did not
decide the status of claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C.
771(2) (1986) in McMahon, but resolved these in Rodriguez.
228. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 669, 677-84 (1986).
229. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1988).
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tual innovations; rather, it is to superimpose judicial review for
adequacy.
A similar point can be made about waivers-that is, exculpatory
provisions that involve no substitution. From a contract law perspec-
tive, such a provision may be deemed "unconscionable," particularly
when the provision cannot be adequately priced (either because of its
open-ended character or because it is inserted into the charter by an
amendment). At bottom, contract law has two inescapable mandatory
norms: the duty of good faith and the rule that unconscionable provi-
sions will not be enforced. 2 30 Difficult as it may be to define the term
"unconscionable," the existence of this important limitation on free-
dom of contract again reminds us that calling a corporation a contract
does not end the debate over whether the governing legal arrange-
ments must contain some minimum mandatory terms.
E. Charter Amendments
Innovative provisions departing from the usual norms of corporate
governance present a special problem when adopted through charter
amendments. As Professor Lucian Bebchuk has pointed out,23 1 charter
amendments are not "priced" by the parties to the corporate contract
in the same way as are provisions in the initial charter, because those
proposing the amendment do not typically bear the costs if it is value
decreasing. 232 Given high information costs and the usual problems of
collective action, Bebchuk concludes that shareholders will invest insuf-
ficient resources to investigate and verify the likely effect of the amend-
ment, and so value-decreasing and redistributive amendments that
transfer wealth from shareholders to managers are possible23 3 .
Although there are problems with this "rational apathy" story,23 4
feasible answers are available to reduce the coercive power that man-
agement has with respect to charter amendments. Often, this coercive
230. See id. § 2-302. Good faith is also a mandatory term of contract law, particu-
larly with respect to open terms. See, e.g., id. § 2-305(2).
231. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1820, 1829, 1837 (1989).
232. Id. at 1829.
233. Id. at 1837-38.
234. For one thing, shareholders could rationally learn to vote against all opt-out
charter amendments as a standard operating procedure, unless management could cred-
ibly bond itself in such a way as to convince shareholders, based on a minimal invest-
ment in information costs, that they were not exposed to loss. In short, the shareholders
could adopt an automatic rule: 'Just Say No." They would deviate from this rule only if
management could show a compelling need for the amendment. This is not an unrealis-
tic posture for shareholders who cannot communicate to adopt, and we observe it to
some extent in some political elections. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in many elec-
tions involving bond referenda, school budgets or state constitutional amendments citi-
zens routinely vote no, possibly because, in the absence of better information, they are
dubious about the value of the proposal. Also, this description may apply to the atti-
tudes of at least some institutional investors toward "shark-repellent" charter amend-
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power comes from management's ability to link the proposal with a
"sweetener" (such as an extraordinary dividend). Here, the practical
answer may be to give shareholders a continuing right to repeal any
deviation from the usual norms of corporate governance (prospectively
and not retroactively, to be sure) because such a power would enable
shareholders to accept the sweetener and then reject the deviation
later.
Another partial solution is to look to the origins of the proposed
innovation. Was it drafted or recommended by an organization having
high reputational capital (e.g., the ALI, the American Bar Association,
or the New York Stock Exchange)?23 5 To be sure, this is no more than
a partial and second-best solution to the problems of collective action
and information asymmetry that make opt-out amendments potentially
value decreasing to shareholders, but reputational capital can partly al-
leviate the problem of high information costs.
To sum up, opt-out charter amendments do require closer scrutiny
than opt-out provisions in the initial charter. The linked problems of
coercion, rational apathy and managerial control over the agenda prob-
ably justify some mandatory legal rules. Still, the intermediate course is
not to prohibit all opt-out charter amendments, but to require objective
judicial review over both their substance and the process of their adop-
tion. The rule proposed in this Article does that and establishes criteria
that courts can apply without engaging in subjective assessments of mo-
tive or good faith. Finally, when an opt-out provision has been drafted
by a body possessing high reputational capital, there is a marginally
ments; indeed, largely for this reason, few managements appear to be proposing such
charter amendments today.
The greater problem with charter amendments, in my judgment, lies elsewhere:
namely, in the potential for agenda manipulation by management. See generally Levine
& Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 Va. L. Rev. 561 (1977) (providing
empirical evidence that substantive results of group decision making are determined by
the agenda and procedures followed). Management can propose amendments that re-
spond to problems also perceived by the shareholders, but that give management exces-
sive discretion. Management's leverage comes from the fact that it can propose the
amendment on an "all or nothing" basis and thereby constrain shareholder choice. For
example, suppose shareholders believe it is desirable to adopt some form of shark repel-
lent antitakeover provision to protect themselves against a partial bid or a "creeping
control" acquisition through open market purchases. Their goal is to force a bidder to
make a 100%, any-and-all cash tender offer. Knowing this, management can propose an
antitakeover charter amendment that is far more stringent than the shareholders desire.
If management is clever, it can confront shareholders with a choice between two unat-
tractive alternatives, of which its proposal is the lesser evil. Of course, the source of
management's leverage is that, under most corporation codes, only the board can pro-
pose the charter amendment. Yet, even if shareholders had a right of shareholder initia-
tive, it would probably mean little, given the usual problems of collective action and
high information costs that make shareholders rationally apathetic.
235. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 970-74 (discussing "quality constraints" on opt-
ing out).
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greater justification for judicial deference to it, but this is a factor to be
balanced, not an iron rule.
IV. THE ROLE OF MANDATORY RULES
Ultimately, the issue of when and to what extent a corporation may
opt out from the existing rules of corporate governance is but a subset
of the larger questions of why the law should impose mandatory rules
at all and when it should change them. The answers to these larger
questions take us back to theories of statutory construction and how
they should affect the standard of judicial review applicable to con-
tracting out.
A. The Public Costs of Private Innovation
The basic trade-off proposed by the previous Part was that opting
out should be permitted, but only within a zone bounded by the duty of
good faith and when either its effect can be specifically priced or a court
can determine that the contractual provision represents an adequate
substitute for the legal rule that would otherwise prevail. This compro-
mise will strike some as an extremely parsimonious recognition of pri-
vate ordering and others as overly generous. In defense of this
proposed compromise, three basic arguments can be made for restrict-
ing the range of private ordering. In the case of each of these justifica-
tions, however, the real question is how much intrusion upon private
ordering follows if one accepts the argument's premises.
The first justification for mandatory rules follows from the premise
of bounded rationality: individuals have limited cognitive powers and
cannot, even under ideal circumstances, anticipate all contingencies.2 30
Hence, provisions will inevitably be left out of the contract that under
conditions of perfect knowledge and rationality would be included.
This argument has probably escaped no one's attention in the recent
debates over contracting, and it can be dressed up with additional ruf-
fles and flourishes. Relying on work by Kenneth Arrow, which suggests
that individuals systematically underestimate future risk, Professor
Eisenberg makes the insightful point that parties tend to discount ex-
cessively the risk of future exploitation. Also, they tend to base their
estimates of risk on a skewed sample drawn from their personal experi-
ence.237 From a cost standpoint, it can also be argued that the attempt
to provide for all contingencies is too expensive both in terms of time
and legal fees. These points have been embellished enough by earlier
236. These cognitive limitations were first introduced in the economic literature by
Herbert Simon and then more fully developed by Oliver Williamson. See Simon, A
Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 QJ. Econ., 99, 114 (1955); 0. Williamson,
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications 9, 21-26 (1975).
237. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1465-66. Professor Eisenberg is chiefly relying on
Arrow, Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics, 20 Econ. Inquiry 1, 5 (1982).
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writers that it is sufficient to quote a balanced summation of this litera-
ture by Professors Hetherington and Dooley: "Given the limitations of
human foresight and knowledge, any attempt to describe the majority's
duties and obligations precisely is likely to leave the minority vul-
nerable to some overlooked form of exploitation while, at the same
time, seriously impairing the efficiency of the firm by fettering
management. '23 8
But note that these arguments really justify default rules or judicial
monitoring, not a prophylactic prohibition on all departures. Bounded
rationality necessitates either that a model form contract be offered by
the state that provides for those contingencies that the parties are apt
to overlook or that courts be authorized to decide how to deal with
risks not anticipated by the parties on an ex post basis. The fact that
humans cannot remember everything hardly implies that they cannot
focus on the few special departures that are proposed in a particular
contract. Indeed, these will stand out precisely because in order to opt
out it will be necessary to contradict explicitly the usual default rule.
A second line of argument has been less frequently made, but pos-
sibly makes a more telling point: the process of contracting about a
long-term business relationship in which one party must place trust and
confidence in another makes it difficult to explore the "downside" pos-
sibilities that such party will be defrauded. To focus on such possibili-
ties is to "queer" the deal.25 9 This observation goes not to cognitive
limits, but to the social processes of contracting, and is probably most
obvious in the kind of face-to-face individual negotiations that charac-
terize closely held firms.
A third category of objections to a wholly enabling corporate law
focuses specifically on opting out and the problem of externalities.
Opting out can impose costs on third parties, which ultimately will be
spread throughout society. For example, increasing the range of con-
tractual innovations that may be introduced into the corporate charter
affects not only investors in corporations that do opt out, but also those
in corporations that do not, because there is always the prospect that
their corporation may do so in the future. Today, both investors and
securities analysts can virtually ignore the corporate charter and focus
exclusively on disclosures that relate to cash flow and breakup value.
But this would not be possible if charter amendments were permissible
that could potentially redistribute wealth among classes of sharehold-
238. Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1, 37 (1977); see
also Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs, Control Premiums
and Capital Structure, 65 Wash. U.L.Q. 1, 59-60 (1987) (discussing bounded rationality
as it applies to formation of the firm).
239. Klein, supra note 183, at 1555; see also Thompson, supra note 173, at 224 ("A
prolonged focus on the 'downside' may seem inconsistent with the mutual trust on
which the business must depend.").
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ers. Not only would analysts have to evaluate the new provisions in the
relatively few companies that did opt out, but they might have to in-
spect the charters of all other companies to make certain that these
charters had only standard terms. Put simply, standardization of con-
tract terms through the use of mandatory legal rules reduces informa-
tion costs for investors. In addition, public costs would be imposed on
the judicial system, as a higher rate of litigation becomes likely in re-
sponse to ambiguous or novel contract terms. Uncertainty about the
interpretation courts would give to novel provisions is also predict-
able.240 Such costs might be justified if there were compensatory bene-
fits. However, the demand for additional options already may be
substantially satisfied by the availability of other jurisdictions of incor-
poration. In a federal system having free corporate mobility between
fifty-odd jurisdictions, the fact that a particular legal option is not avail-
able may testify either to its suspect character or to the lack of demand
for it. As with Sherlock Holmes's dog that did not bark in the night, its
omission supplies significant evidence. Given the existing diversity of
options available to public corporations, one can reasonably doubt
whether significant benefits would be gained from a fuller ability to opt
out than that proposed above. One important exception to this gener-
alization, however, is the transaction-specific amendment; here, special,
idiosyncratic factors may be at work, and the availability of other legal
regimes in other jurisdictions has less relevance.
B. The Efficient Role of the Court: Mandatory Duties Versus Hypothetical
Bargaining
If one accepts the initial contention that ex post judicial review is a
necessary element in efficient corporate governance, the next issue is
the methodology the court should follow in performing this role. Here,
it is easier to describe what courts have in fact done than the rationale
for their role. Delaware case law is particularly clear in the distinction it
has drawn between the breadth of the board's authority and the propri-
ety of its exercise of that authority in a given case. In a series of deci-
sions chiefly involving efforts by managers to entrench themselves, 24 1
Delaware courts have repeatedly said that actions within the scope of
the board's legal authority will nonetheless be overturned if the exer-
cise of that authority was not for a proper purpose. One decision
phrased this point particularly aptly, saying in effect that there was an
implicit term in the corporate contract: "namely that corporate ma-
240. This point about fear of misinterpretation of a novel term has been made ef-
fectively by Goetz and Scott, who argue that such uncertainty will often lead private
parties to prefer standardized terms that imperfectly express their desired arrange-
ments. See Goetz & Scott, Limits, supra note 5, at 266.
241. See, e.g., Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 20, 187 A.2d 405, 408 (1962);
Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967); Petty v.
Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975).
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chinery may not be manipulated so as to injure minority stockhold-
ers." 242 In short, the concomitant to a broad delegation of authority to
management is the obligation to use that delegated authority for value-
maximizing purposes.
But how does a court decide when the "corporate machinery" is
being misused? Here, two rival methodologies exist. Traditional fidu-
ciary theorists can cite precedents that, either directly or by analogy,
establish rules of behavior for virtually any fact pattern that can arise in
the corporate context. Whether these fiduciary rules are value maxi-
mizing in the aggregate for all the parties is not a principal concern to
these theorists because these rules express their moral theory on how
persons should behave. 243 Conversely, the proponents of hypothetical
bargaining will look only to what maximizes value (from an ex ante per-
spective) for the parties. Under this alternative approach, once it is de-
termined that the contract is silent on any important point, a court
should seek to determine what arrangement the parties would have
adopted ex ante if they, as rational wealth-maximizers, had addressed
the question on a fully informed basis. 244 This approach will often pro-
duce the same result as fiduciary analysis, but at other times it can be
very indeterminate. Under the hypothetical bargaining approach, the
legal rule that the parties would have adopted on a fully informed basis
will be deemed to be the rule that creates the greatest wealth, regard-
less of its distribution. 245 This approach invites the court to engage in
an extraordinary range of judicial speculations about what maximizes
shareholder value. For example, under this approach, if it could be
shown that permitting insider trading would create more wealth for
managers than it would cost shareholders, hypothetical bargaining
would yield the result that the corporate charter should not be read to
prohibit insider trading, at least unless a charter provision did so
explicitly.
In his provocative commentary following this Article, Professor
Macey claims that only the hypothetical bargaining approach can recon-
cile the tensions between the mandatory and enabling features of cor-
porate law and that there is in fact little difference between hypothetical
bargaining and the approach proposed in this Article. 246 Yet, the dif-
ference is clear: Under my approach, the normal default rules of fiduci-
ary duty would generally govern unless the parties have clearly opted
242. Condec Corp., 230 A.2d at 775.
243. This distinction between the moral theory of fiduciary duties and the eco-
nomic theory of hypothetical bargaining has been well made by Professor Clark. See
Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in Principals and Agents: The Structure of
Business 55, 76 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985).
244. See R. Posner, supra note 12, at 79-85.
245. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 2,. at
702-04.
246. Macey, Courts and Corporations: A Comment on Coffee, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
1692, 1694-95 (1989).
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out by a valid charter provision that is sufficiently transaction specific
that investors can appraise its impact. This approach is deliberately co-
ercive in that it compels those possessing discretion or private informa-
tion to contract around the default rule and in so doing to reveal their
actual intentions. 247 Such an approach is very different from one that
permits courts to redefine fiduciary duties in all cases according to the
criterion of aggregate wealth maximization. The latter approach not
only leads to excessive indeterminacy and confusion, but it essentially
repeals the principle of stare decisis, which, while not an absolute bar-
rier to legal change, is itself a rule that promotes efficiency and reduces
the public costs associated with corporate governance. 248
This potential for indeterminacy is graphically illustrated by the
differing opinions in Jordan v. Duff &Phelps, Inc.249 There, the issue was
how to read a buy-sell agreement that required an employee to sell his
stock back to the corporation upon his termination of service. Would
this provision permit the majority shareholder to cause the corporation
to fire the employee and then repurchase his stock at only its book
value? In his dissent, Judge Posner said it would and justified this re-
sult through a resort to hypothetical bargaining. In his view, a rational
shareholder, bargaining from an ex ante position, might well waive all
statutory and fiduciary protections that the law affords him and would
willingly rely on the company's desire to preserve its reputational capi-
tal as his sole protection.2 50 However, Judge Easterbrook, who wrote
the majority decision and who also strongly favors hypothetical bar-
gaining, reached a contrary result by assessing the kind of employment
agreement into which rational actors would have entered. 25 1 Judge
247. Subsequent to writing this Article, I have found that a draft manuscript by
Professors Ayres and Gertner takes a similar position and proposes a general theory of
"penalty" default rules. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, (forthcoming 98 Yale LJ. (Oct. 1989)). I agree with
their general theory, but believe that the problem of gap definition is more complicated
in the corporate context. See supra notes 15-16.
248. Many of the arguments made by Professor Monaghan about the role of stare
decisis in constitutional adjudication apply with equal force in this context. See
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723,
744-55 (1988) (emphasizing role of stare decisis in agenda limitation and in political
legitimacy ofjudicial review).
249. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987).
250. Id. at 448 (Posner, J., dissenting) (emphasizing willingness of shareholders to
"take their chances on their employer's good will and interest in reputation").
25 1. Id. at 436. In this respect, I cannot agree with Professor Macey's contention in
his comment to this Article that Judges Easterbrook and Posner disagreed only about
fiduciary duties under Illinois employment law. See Macey, supra note 246, at 1696
n.12. Judge Easterbrook clearly uses the parties' silence to infer those terms "we are
confident that the parties would have bargained for if they had signed a written agree-
ment." Jordan, 815 F.2d at 438. This is hypothetical bargaining par excellence. If "Rule
lOb-5 is murky when securities transactions are consummated with employees," as Pro-
fessor Macey argues, Macey, supra note 246, at 1696 n.12, the root cause is that the
majority and the dissent disagree about the underlying nature of the fiduciary duty be-
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Easterbrook read an implied fiduciary duty into the relationship; Judge
Posner did not. Yet, both judges began from the same starting point.
In this lightJordan suggests that hypothetical bargaining supplies only
a vague and shifting guide.
In this light, a strong efficiency argument can be made that the
parties should be forced to opt out affirmatively from the usual rules of
corporate governance, with the court considering only at that point
whether any proposed modification meets the test of hypothetical bar-
gaining. A standard rule of construction for contracts is to interpret all
ambiguity against the draftsman. Such a rule is efficient because it both
minimizes the risk of deliberate deceit by the draftsman and creates an
incentive for achieving precision. Clearly, management controls the
corporate agenda and, directly or indirectly, is the "draftsman" of any
midstream change in the corporate charter. Thus, ambiguity should be
construed against management. By permitting opting out but insisting
on relatively strict construction of the traditional default rules of fiduci-
ary duty, this Article's approach achieves this result. Its net effect is to
create an incentive to be precise and to raise the costs of opportunism,
without rejecting all contractual innovations. In addition, greater cer-
tainty results because the traditional rules of fiduciary duty are well
known and will apply absent express provision to the contrary. To sum
up: consider the difference in incentives. Under the hypothetical bar-
gaining approach, a manager can act in a self-interested fashion, hop-
ing later to convince a court that such behavior, if detected and
challenged, was efficient because it maximized aggregate wealth and
thus was what rational parties would have agreed to. Yet, under a coer-
cive default rule, such conduct is only permissible if authorized by a
charter provision. Hence, there is both an increased incentive to dis-
close and seek approval and a reduced incentive to attempt to make
new law through costly litigation.
Two other significant problems with hypothetical bargaining in-
volve its feasibility and fairness. Doctrinally, the triggering condition of
hypothetical bargaining is the court's discovery that a term of the con-
tract is "missing" or was somehow "omitted. ' ' 252 Such omissions do in
fact occur in ordinary contracting, but they arguably will be infrequent
in the corporate context. This is because the corporate charter is a
unique form of contract. Because a detailed specification of all rights,
risks and performance standards is not feasible, 253 the corporate char-
ter essentially specifies a governance mechanism for the resolution of
future disputes. Basically, corporate law entrusts authority to the board
of directors, subject to some judicial oversight, to resolve all future dis-
putes. Thus, unlike other contracts that attempt a more comprehensive
tween employer and employee (which duty must be breached for a Rule lOb-5 violation
to occur).
252. See Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 879.
253. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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assignment of rights and responsibilities, the corporate contract is usu-
ally a relatively simple and short document. In this sense, it is some-
thing of a misnomer to speak of terms that are "missing" or "omitted"
from the corporate contract. Although omissions can sometimes occur,
the corporate charter has its own default rule: Except as specified to
the contrary, everything is to be decided by the board (subject possibly
to the check of shareholder ratification). How the board uses that
power is likely to be the subject of much friction and litigation, but
classic fiduciary law long ago filled in this gap in the contract-unless
the parties can and do opt out from it.
Finally, there is the issue of fairness. Suppose a term in the con-
tract is sufficiently vague on its face, or obsolete in its policy founda-
tions, as to appear inefficient to the court. Still, its meaning may have
been well understood by the parties at the time they bargained. If a
court later changes the meaning of this term through the use of the
hypothetical bargaining approach, there is a redistributive impact. One
side loses something for which it may have bargained; another side may
receive a windfall gain. Were the legislature to do this by changing the
meaning of a term in a contract to the detriment of one side, Professor
Macey probably would see this as an unconstitutional "impairment" of
contract.2 54 Why should the result be any different when a court does
the same thing? Put simply, fairness requires that we not disrupt the
parties' legitimate expectations lightly, and those expectations tend to
be based on the existing state of the law at the time the bargain was
struck. Conceivably, the parties sometimes may have no expectations,
but if hypothetical bargaining applies only in this case it will have a
minor impact.
Does this position imply that no role exists for hypothetical bar-
gaining? On the contrary, there are several roles it can and should le-
gitimately play. First, it supplies the principal constraint on opting out.
The test proposed in the preceding section, with its focus on transac-
tion specificity, simply assumes that the parties would not rationally
modify the default rules of fiduciary duties unless they could clearly
appreciate, or "price," the range of transactions over which different
rules would apply. As a constraint, this is a refinement on the hypothet-
ical bargaining standard a court would apply if it found that a term had
been omitted from an agreement, but it operates as a check on what the
parties have done, rather than as a grant of power to the courts to re-
make the law. A second, more modest role would arise when a vague
term in the corporate statute had no preexisting meaning in the case
law on which either side reasonably could have placed expectations.
For example, suppose the "oppression" remedy had just been added to
the corporate statutes of the first state to adopt this remedy and no
254. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, c. 1.
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statutory definition of this term had been supplied.255 This would
amount to a legislative invitation for judicial lawmaking, and, in such
circumstances, there is no conflict between the shareholders' legitimate
expectations and efficiency. In this situation, the court's decision would
not have any distributive impact that can be considered unfair. In
short, when writing on a clean slate, the court may look primarily to the
efficiency considerations upon which hypothetical bargaining relies. Fi-
nally, there are, no doubt, occasions when the demonstrable ineffi-
ciency of a rule can justify overruling it, notwithstanding the principle
of stare decisis, 256 but such instances are the exception, not the rule.
C. "Private Deals" Versus "Public-Regarding" Legislation
The question of when a court may change the "default rules" of
corporate governance necessarily intersects with broader issues of stat-
utory interpretation. The latter context has recently witnessed a lively
debate among "law and economics" scholars. On one hand, Judge
Easterbrook has advocated an approach to statutory interpretation that
assumes that legislation is frequently the product of a "deal" made be-
tween the legislature and interest groups that sought or opposed the
statute. His view of the principle of legislative supremacy leads him to
see courts as the honest enforcer of whatever outcomes emerge from
the process of drafting legislation. 257 In effect, if the legislature has
been "bought," the courts should let it stay bought. In response to this
view of legislation as a form of contract, others have answered that
courts should read statutes as if they were "public-regarding"- that is,
as intended to maximize value for society as a whole.258 Professor
Macey has made such an argument from a perspective every bit as hard-
boiled as that ofJudge Easterbrook and is equally convinced that inter-
est groups determine legislative outcomes and thereby "seek to trans-
255. I discuss this example in more detail at infra notes 275-78 and accompanying
text.
256. See infira notes 271-78 and accompanying text. Obviously, a court is freer to
modify common law rules than statutory policies, but even the latter are subject to revi-
sion, as the next section explores.
257. See Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 15-18 (1984). The view that statutes
should be interpreted as legislative deals probably originated with Landes & Posner,
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875
(1975).
258. See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Inter-
pretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223 (1986). Professors Hart
and Sacks would certainly take a similar view. They argue that, in construing a statute, a
court "should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was
made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably." H. Hart &
A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of the Law
1415 (tent. ed. 1958). They add that courts should not construe a statute "in the mood
of a cynical political observer, taking account of all the short-run currents of political
expedience that swirl around any legislative session." Id. at 1414.
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fer wealth to themselves from the rest of society." 259 Still, he believes
that the judiciary can brake this process by enforcing only those special
interest deals that amount to what he terms "open-explicit bargains" or
statutes that are explicitly "naked wealth transfers to special interest
groups. ' 260 Thus, he favors a canon of construction that regards legis-
lation as "public-regarding" unless the statute explicitly indicates its
intent to favor such a special interest group, because such a canon of
construction raises the cost of enacting special interest statutes. In his
view, this scheme to raise the cost of special interest legislation is pref-
erable to authorizing courts to invalidate such statutes because it does
not raise the same specter of an imperial judiciary able to ignore the
majority. For similar reasons, Professor Macey apparantly also would
favor a canon of construction under which "statutes in derogation of
the common law should be strictly construed." 26 1 Obviously, such a
presumption would read the common law's rules on fiduciary duties as
controlling unless an explicit legislative intent to disavow them was
evident. 262
Although there seems to be a tension in Professor Macey's work
between his view of corporate law as exclusively contractual and his
view of the proper approach to statutory construction as "public-
regarding," his view of legislation is clearly preferable to Judge
Easterbrook's legislation-as-contract perspective. In any event, which
view one takes can have a profound impact on how many corporate
statutes are interpreted. For example, some recent corporate legisla-
tion bears all the earmarks of special interest legislation. Foi" example,
numerous state antitakeover statutes have been adopted almost over-
night at the behest of a single target company.26 3 Much the same pat-
tern of breakneck legislation has characterized recent efforts to enact
statutes reducing or eliminating directors' liability for "due care"
violations.264
How then should such legislation be interpreted by courts? The
opportunities are numerous for courts to engage in interstitial decision
259. Macey, supra note 258, at 267.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 264.
262. Thus, I find Professor Macey's views in his comment to this Article somewhat
inconsistent with his prior position to the extent that he now seems prepared to permit
courts to change the default rules without shareholder action.
263. See Davis, Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the
States, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 491,493 (describing "fast-track, save a particular corporation"
statute, but noting that Wisconsin's experience was more deliberate); Romano, The
Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 111, 134-38 (state takeover leg-
islation is usually the product of a "putting out fires" legislative response to lobbying
pressure from a single constituent). In my view, even where the legislature has sought
to be "public-regarding" in its response, most efforts to date in this area have been hasty
and ill-conceived, and the legislatures have been generally overreached by the lobbyists.
264. See Hanks, supra note 134, at 1243 (since 1985, four-fifths of states have en-
acted legislation protecting directors from financial liability).
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making on questions of policy. For example, should they treat the new
Delaware antitakeover statute, which in theory protects shareholders
against coercive partial bids and low premium "street sweeps," as a rea-
son for granting less deference to private efforts to prevent such take-
overs through poison pills, lockups and similar tactics? If we view this
question from Judge Easterbrook's "private deal" perspective, it would
be inconsistent to offset the legislature's decision to favor a special in-
terest group-corporate managements and their allies-by tightening
the legal restrictions on alternative defense tactics, such as the flip-in
pill. Yet, from a "public-regarding" perspective, it may be appropriate
to conclude that once the problemof coercive pressure in takeovers has
been carefully addressed by the legislature, there is less needfor poten-
tially harmful and overbroad private efforts.
The new legislation that permits charter amendments which re-
duce or eliminate due care liability presents similar issues of statutory
interpretation. Many of these statutes contain ambiguous exceptions
that make vague references to causes of action for which liability may
not be exculpated. 265 Others are vague as to whether duty of loyalty
liability can also be eliminated. From a "public-regarding" perspective,
provisions in derogation of the common law's fiduciary duties should
be strictly construed. Conversely, from a "private deal" perspective,
one could say that the value of the legislation to the special interest
group (here, management) would be vitiated if plaintiffs had only to
recharacterize their complaints as duty of loyalty actions instead of duty
of care actions.
Operationally, a "public-regarding" approach should posit that a
basic purpose of corporate law is to reduce agency costs. (Here, both
the traditional fiduciary duty and the hypothetical bargaining approach
give similar answers.) Then, except to the extent that the charter or
statutory law provides clear answers to the contrary, the court should
use this agency-cost-reduction premise as its canon of construction.
While the court may not ignore settled precedent or the parties' clearly
expressed intent, it can to this extent pursue its concept of efficiency.
Indeed, from a positive law perspective, this description is probably a
reasonably accurate account of the takeover decisions of the Delaware
courts since Unocal.2 66
D. Statutory Cy Pres: When Can a Court Update a Statute?
The issue of the appropriate limits on purposive judicial interpre-
tation of statutes is not new,2 6 7 but some recent proposals are. For
265. See id. at 1237-38, 1240-41.
266. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985);
Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs.
v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
267. The classic debate on this issue was between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller in
1958, with Fuller arguing that purposive interpretation could be consistent with Hart's
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example, Dean Calabresi has argued that in our contemporary eco-
nomic and political environment, which he sees as characterized by
rapid technological change and legislative stasis, statutes regularly be-
come "obsolete. ;' 268 His proposed response is to permit courts to treat
an out-of-date statute as a nullity, subject, of course, to the legislature's
power to reenact it. Although this challenge to the principle of legisla-
tive supremacy has proven too much for most theorists of statutory in-
terpretation to swallow whole, some have recognized merit in
Calabresi's analysis and therefore have recommended an intermediate
position: namely, that a court is entitled to reinterpret and update a
statute's intent in light of new and changed circumstances. Drawing an
analogy to the traditional trust law doctrine of cy pres, Professor Farber
has argued that such an approach is more faithful to the legislature's
intent than is rigid enforcement of an out-of-date policy in a radically
different world.2 69 To some degree, this position may rebottle old wine
in a new container, because it seems to parallel closely Lon Fuller's
well-known position.270
Calabresi's bold formulation is problematic, but in fact the process
he advocates may already exist, albeit to a lesser degree. Faced with
"obsolete" statutes, courts do reread the statutory policy in increas-
ingly narrow and restricted terms. This phenomenon is observable in
the corporate arena as in others. Consider, for example, the old rule
that prohibited "sterilization" of the board. Originally, this principle
rejected private ordering in favor of mandatory legal duties. Over time,
many states adopted a close corporation statute authorizing contractual
deviations to protect minority shareholders. Suppose, however, that
one state has not and that such a close corporation provision deviating
from the common-law is adopted by the shareholders of a corporation
incorporated in that state. In this case, the rule, whether statutory or
common law, forbidding commercial arrangements that infringe the
board's autonomy seems "obsolete" in the Calabresian sense. In such
a context, the probability seems high today that such a provision would
be upheld. 271
To take another example, suppose a court is faced with the first
generation of poison pills. It understands that coercive takeovers are a
possibility and that two-tier, front-loaded bids are a recent develop-
ment. In light of these changed circumstances, may it modify the long-
standing, but seldom examined, rule that all shares of a class must be
concern for fidelity to law. Compare Hart, Positivism and The Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1958) with Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Re-
ply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 661-69 (1958).
268. See G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 1-7 (1982).
269. Farber, supra note 199.
270. Fuller, supra note 267, at 661-69.
271. Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1980), is
certainly a strong indication that courts will strain to uphold such agreements, absent
fraud or secrecy. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
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treated equally?2 72 Essentially, Delaware did so in Moran v. Household
International273 and New York declined to do so in Bank of New York v.
Irving Bank Corp. 274 One can debate whether the Moran court correctly
perceived the reality of the takeover "threat," but it seems clear that
New York's approach in Irving Bank was to abdicate all questions of
policy to the legislature. Ultimately, the best argument for the
Delaware approach is that the Delaware courts did not simply defer to
private ordering, but rather understood the critical importance of ex
post judicial review.
Statutory updating need not result exclusively in the narrowing of
statutes. On the contrary, statutes can provide a statement of princi-
ples, based on which courts can also update "obsolete" common law.
The common law is full of examples in which courts have updated the
common law so as to generalize new statutory rules beyond their con-
text. Yet, when a court decides that the common law should mirror the
statutory standard, it may be acting in violation ofJudge Easterbrook's
precept that a court should stick to the terms of the "private deal." To
illustrate, the New York case law on involuntary judicial dissolution has
long been characterized by divided authority. Some decisions suggest
that there is an inherent judicial power to dissolve closely held corpora-
tions on a showing of oppression to the minority; some disagree. 275 In
part to reconcile these cases, the New York Legislature adopted Busi-
ness Corporation Law section 1104-a, 2 76 which authorizes the holders
of twenty percent of the voting stock of a New York corporation other,
than a publicly held corporation, to seek judicial dissolution on
grounds of oppression. What happens, however, if the holders of only
ten percent seek dissolution based on a strong showing of oppression?
Should a court read the legislative "deal" as being one that protected
management from claims brought by small minority interests, possibly
because of a perceived tendency for small shareholders to bring frivo-
lous claims? In fact, New York courts have expanded the remedy, in
effect generalizing it beyond its legislative limitations.2 77 In substance,
these courts have taken a "public-regarding" approach, which views the
legislature as primarily concerned about a problem (here, oppression
of the minority) that they have instructed the courts to solve. If the
272. See supra text accompanying notes 139-49.
273. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
274. 112 Misc. 2d 145, 536 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
275. In Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963), the New York
Court of Appeals created a common-law remedy of dissolution for oppression. But see
Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965); Cachules v. Finkelstein, 279
A.D. 173, 109 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1951) (denying actions for dissolution under general equi-
table powers of court on ground that the corporation was a creature of statute).
276. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, § 1104-a(1) (McKinney 1986).
277. See Lewis v.Jones, 107 A.D.2d 931, 932, 483 N.Y.S.2d 868, 869 (1985) (find-
ing that a denial of an adequate remedy to a shareholder who lacks standing under N.Y.
Bus. Corp. Law § 1104-a would be a result "abhorrent to thq common law").
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statute may be regarded as such a legislative instruction, then there is
little reason to read its outer limits narrowly or to fear disrupting polit-
ical compromises. 278
Precisely because I approve of such decisions, the question un-
avoidably surfaces: Is not such a "public-regarding" approach func-
tionally the equivalent of a "hypothetical bargaining" model (of which I
was earlier skeptical), at least if one assumes that the law's goals in the
corporate context are to maximize aggregate shareholder wealth?
Should we not still be concerned about the legitimate expectations of
the parties to the corporate contract? Of course, the answer is yes, but
the critical issue involves determining the legitimacy of these expecta-
tions. Here, an important distinction must be drawn between overrul-
ing a legislative policy and implementing it. Overruling must be
approached cautiously. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,279 the
Supreme Court recently specified fairly narrow criteria to determine
when priorjudicial interpretations of statutory policy may be overruled,
saying that courts may do so only when "either the growth of judicial
doctrine or further action taken by Congress [has] removed or weak-
ened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision. s280
Although a few earlier corporate precedents, such as those forbidding
sterilization of the board, may have become sufficiently archaic as to
satisfy these stiff conditions for outright overruling,281 such opportuni-
ties are relatively rare.
In contrast, judicial activism is more appropriate in implementing a
legislative instruction to deal with a problem. Sometimes the legisla-
ture will pass a statute with an open-ended, vaguely elastic term. The
familiar corporate statute authorizing courts to provide a remedy on a
finding of "oppression" is an example of this looser form of statute,282
278. Judge Easterbrook appears to agree with this conclusion. See Easterbrook,
Statutes' Domain, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 551 (1983).
279. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). Patterson did not overrule a prior precedent and thus
shows the court using this formulation as a conservative limiting rule of construction.
280. Id. at 2370. In addition, it added that precedent may be overruled when it has
become "a positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the law, either because of
inherent confusion, created by an unworkable decision.., or because the decision poses
a direct obstacle to the realization of important objectives embodied in other laws." Id.
at 2371.
281. Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1980), seems
an example of a decision recognizing that the old law on sterilization had been weak-
ened by the enactment of a new statute (N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b) (McKinney
1986)). See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text. In Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at
2370-71, the Court cited as an example of when overruling was appropriate its own
recent decision in Rodriguez de QuiJas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
1917 (1989) (reversing earlier interpretation of federal securities statutes as forbidding
mandatory arbitration of claims founded on them). Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2370.
282. Today, some thirty-seven states authorize involuntary judicial dissolution (or
similar relie of a close corporation on a showing of oppression. See Thompson, supra
note 173, at 206. Historically, courts required a showing of deadlock, fraud, or active
misconduct before they would order liquidation, but over recent years, the new trend
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which is essentially a legislative instruction to the-courts to solve a diffi-
cult, fact-specific problem. When the court is thus called upon to "fill
the gap," the line between common-law policy making and statutory
construction largely disappears. 283 Nor are the parties to the contract
as entitled to have legitimate expectations about the scope of such
terms. Indeed, because the statute was, in most instances, enacted long
after the time of corporate formation, pursuant to the state's reserved
power over the corporate charter, the parties never relied on any previ-
ously settled interpretation of the term. More importantly, even share-
holders in corporations formed subsequent to the statute's passage or
its first judicial construction were on notice that the term's meaning
could evolve over time, because the legislature had delegated to the
courts the task of solving the problem. Problem solving is a dynamic
process, and hence one should not expect the law to remain static.
CONCLUSION
If the new breed of lawyer-economists is to be listened to by
courts, they must, in turn, listen to how courts think. How then do
courts think about contractual freedom and opting out? Clearly, they
do not view statutory corporate law as simply a body of default rules,
which shareholders may waive at will. Rather, courts exercise substan-
tial discretion to accept or reject a contractual innovation, depending
upon whether they attribute a "fat" or a "thin" policy to the statutory
norm asserted to be in conflict with the charter provision. As a statute
begins to seem obsolete or superfluous, courts have recurrently shown
a willingness to shrink their conception of its underlying policy, but
only on a few occasions have courts converted a mandatory norm into a
default rule.
This tolerance for innovation is, however, only half the story. The
other half is a judicial tradition of construing broad and ambiguous
charter provisions to contain implied conditions that the majority not
use its powers to exclude or disfavor the minority. As a result, contrac-
tual innovation and a judicial power to discover implied conditions are
not adversarial theories, but symbiotic ones.
Above all, this Article has been aimed at the fallacy of the excluded
middle. Between the position that freedom to opt out will lead to the
destruction of fiduciary duties and its polar opposite that restrictions
on private ordering prohibit efficient innovations and enforce outdated
has been to order such relief on a showing that the minority shareholders' "reasonable
expectations" had been frustrated. This standard of the "reasonable expectations of the
shareholders, as they exist at the inception of the enterprise, and as they develop there-
after through a course of dealing concurred in by all of them" was recommended by
Professor F. Hodge O'Neal, a leading expert in this field, in his much cited treatise. F.
O'Neal, "Squeeze-Outs" of Minority Shareholders § 7.15, at 525 (1975).
283. See Farber, supra note 199; Merrill, The Common Law Power of Federal
Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 3-7 (1985).
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or overbroad legal rules, there is a middle ground: courts can tolerate
and monitor some departures in this area, much as they have done in
other forms of contracting. The relevant task for the future then
should be to define the area of tolerable departures, rather than to pro-
long the holy war over opting out. Ultimately, the scope of permissible
opting out should be defined principally in terms of one's estimate of
judicial competence at monitoring opportunism. Here, there is room
for debate, but in this Article's view, courts seem to have done better in
dealing with the close corporation than with the public corporation.
Because shareholders are generally acknowledged to be more exposed
to loss in the close corporation setting,284 this greater judicial willing-
ness to monitor in that context is understandable. Still, active monitor-
ing requires a clear theory of the rights to be protected and the evils to
be guarded against. The majority's recurring desire to oust or exclude
the minority in the close corporation setting offers an easily understood
villain, but management's desire to entrench itself in the public corpo-
ration presents a more problematic, lower visibility target. Fewer
bright line distinctions exist by which to separate the ordinary world of
business judgments from transactions affected by conflicts of interest.
Partly because of this skepticism about how well courts will enforce the
duty of good faith in the public corporation setting, this Article has
recommended a coequal constraint of transaction specificity.
Ironically, the position taken by this Article finds both sides in the
debate between the contractarians and the anticontractarians to be par-
tially correct. The contractarians are correct in favoring greater free-
dom for contractual innovation, and the anticontractarians are equally
correct in favoring rigid fiduciary rules. The irony is that prophylactic
rules make the optimal default rules because they maximize the incen-
tive to contract around them and, in so doing, to maximize disclosure.
Default rules matter-and matter greatly-because they will establish
the parties' legal entitlements whenever the transaction costs of modi-
fying them exceed the benefits of a superior rule. In particular, because
only those controlling the corporation can propose an innovative char-
ter provision, such innovations are likely to occur only when the bene-
fits flow, at least in part, to them. As a result, innovations will be
predictably one-sided, and the rate of innovation will be suboptimal.
This argues for judicial activism, both in monitoring novel charter pro-
visions and in redefining the default rules when a superior default rule
would favor those lacking access to the charter amendment process.
Still, more than default rules are needed, and the mandatory minimum
to relational contracting in the corporate context should be defined by
the duty of good faith and the requirement of transaction specificity.
284. The usual reasons for this view include not only the absence of a liquid market
for their shares, but also the factor of asset specificity. Human assets are invested in the
close corporation and cannot be redeployed costlessly because they are to a de'gree firm-
specific. See 0. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 313 (1985).
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What these rules leave open for negotiation and opting out is the zone
between fiduciary law's requirement of selflessness and contract law's
norm of good faith. Within this zone, if the departure can be accurately
priced, neither normative nor econoinic theories supply adequate rea-
sons to preclude contractual innovations.
This approach combines ex ante incentives to disclose with ex post
judicial monitoring for opportunism. If new and unforeseen circum-
stances arise, charter amendments are possible, but the court should
not rewrite fiduciary law on its own so as to permit managers or con-
trolling shareholders to appropriate all the gains (as they may under a
hypothetical bargaining approach on the assumption that rational par-
ties "would have wanted" the wealth maximizing outcome). As new
and previously unforeseen circumstances arise, the true contractarian
approach is to force the parties to bargain over foreseeable allocations
of gains and losses and not for a court to imagine unnecessarily what
they would have wanted. Only the minority are entitled to have the
court change the default rule in their favor. Those in control should be
forced to contract and, in so doing, to reveal their intentions and secure
disinterested approval.
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